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ABSTRACT 
Negotiation is an integral part of everyday life. It is a process whereby parties 
come together and attempt to reach an agreement that is of mutual benefit and that 
sets the framework for future dealings. While the goal of any contract negotiation 
is to reach an agreement, mere are instances when, for various reasons, 
negotiations reach an impasse. The consequences can be serious for both DOD 
and industry. If a negotiation associated with developing and/or fielding a major 
weapon system breaks down, DOD's ability to meet mission goals is adversely 
affected. Likewise, the impasse can threaten the financial health of the prospective 
prime contractor and associated subcontractors, weakening the defense industrial 
base. 
This thesis developed an understanding of the factors which contribute to the 
occurrence of a contract negotiations impasse, and how a knowledge of these 
factors may be utilized to avoid the impasse and improve the negotiation process. 
The research focused on DOD and defense industry practicing contract negotiators. 
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I. Dr.L'ROD'O'C'l'IOH 
A. PURPOSB 01' '1'BB USBARCB 
Negotiations are a fundamental part of everyday existence. 
Parents negotiate with children, and husbands with wives. Law 
enforcement officials negotiate with terrorists. The President 
negotiates with Congress. In recent years, negotiation has 
come to be seen as an integral part of management existence. 
In Fiscal Year (FY) 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
procured goods and services valued at $113.3 billion. Of this 
amount, only $7.2 billion used the sealed bid method, meaning 
that potentially $106.1 billion worth of contracts were 
negotiated. Nearly one-third, or $34.7 billion, were sole-
source procurements [Ref. 1:p. 83]. 
While the goal of any contract negotiation is to reach an 
agreement, there are instances when, for various reasons, 
negotiations reach an impasse. The consequences can be 
serious for both DOD and industry. If a negotiation 
associated with developing and/or fielding a major weapon 
system breaks down, DOD's ability to "meet the threat" is 
adversely affected. Likewise, the impasse can threaten the 
financial health of the prospective prime contractor and 
associated ~ubcontractors, weakening the defense industrial 
base. 
1 
There are circumstances where reaching an impasse may be 
rational, such as when the parties have better alternatives 
available to them [Ref. 2: p. 110] . However, empirical 
research has demonstrated that negotiators often make 
decisions irrationally, and consequently fail to reach 
mutually beneficial agreements. 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an understanding 
of the factors which contribute to the occurrence of a 
contract negotiations impasse, and how a knowledge of these 
factors may be utilized to avoid the impasse and improve the 
negotiation process. While literally thousands of books and 
lesser works have been devoted to various aspects of the 
negotiation process, relatively few have focused primarily on 
the impasse, and even less have examined the contract 
negotiations impasse. As far as this researcher was able to 
determine, none of the existing research has focused on the 
contract negotiations impasse from the perspective of 
practicing contract negotiators. This is perplexing, given 
the sizeable role of contract negotiations in both Government 
and business. Thus, this thesis seeks to fill this gap in the 
existing negotiations literature. 
B. GENERAL DBSCRIP'l'ION OP '1'BB RBSBARCB 
The primary research data gathering method was a 
questionnaire which was sent to both DOD and defense industry 
negotiators after having been refined based on a field test. 
2 
The questionnaire was designed to be answered anonymously if 
desired, although the questionnaire did include a query as to 
whether the respondent would be willing to be interviewed 
concerning his responses. Many respondents answered in the 
affirmative, and so a number of interviews were conducted with 
negotiators in order to clarify responses and elicit 
additional information. An additional data gathering method; 
examining video tapes of negotiations conducted between third 
quarter students in the Acquisition and Contract Management 
curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School; did not provide 
any information as none of these negotiations ended in an 
impasse. 
C. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of entering into contract negotiations is to 
reach a mutually advantageous agreement, not an impasse. A 
negotiation which ends in impasse wastes two valuable 
resources: time and money. The relationship between the 
individuals and org~nizations involved may become strained. 
As indicated earlier, DOD's mission capability and the 
contractor's financial stability may be jeopardized. 
The primary objective of this research is to ascertain hew 
the impasse scenario develops, and, knowing this, determine 
appropriate actions which could be taken by contract 
negotiators to avoid an impasse and thereby improve the 
negotiation process. 
3 
A second objective is to compare and contrast DOD and 
industry negotiators' perspectives of the impasse. 
Identification of any differences between these negotiators 
may provide valuable insight on how to improve the negotiation 
process between DOD and industry negotiators. 
D. RBSBAR.CB QUESTION 
Primary Research Question: 
• What are the principal factors and characteristics that 
lead to a contract negotiation impasse and how might the 
knowledge of these factors and characteristics be utilized 
to improve the negotiation process and avoid an impasse? 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
• What are the key characteristics of a contract negotiation 
impasse? 
• What are the typical situations and scenarios which lead 
to a contract negotiation impasse? 
• What are the actions or steps which could be taken by 
contract negotiators to avoid an impasse? 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OP RBSBARCB 
While the realm of negotiations is very broad, this 
research will be limited in scope to that of contract 
negotiation impasses experienced by practicing DOD and defense 
industry contract negotiators. The research will be limited 
to identifying the events and circumstances which lead to the 
impasse, and how they may be avoided. The research will not 
seek to determine what actions should be taken after an 
4 
., 
impasse is reached. Several issues proved limiting in terms 
of research, but none proved to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
One limitation was that an impasse could not be artificially 
induced during a real-world contract negotiation. A second 
limitation was that a researcher is typically not allowed to 
conduct research in an actual negotiation setting, because few 
contractors are willing to bare themselves when money and 
proprietary issues are at stake. Thirdly, there was no way to 
obtain or "pair up" questionnaires from both parties involved 
in a particular contract negotiation which ended in impasse 
due to the anonymous nature of the questionnaire. 
Consequently, some bias is likely to be present in some of the 
responses. However, the honesty and comprehensiveness of the 
answers given as a direct result of the anonymous nature of 
the questionnaire should reduce the amount of bias present. 
Further, the negotiators' perceptions are of relevance to 
this research effort in and of themselves. What a particular 
negotiator perceives is, in essence, his or her "reality." 
P. LITBRATORB R.BVIBW ARD KBTIIODOLOGY 
While very little research has been devoted exclusively to 
the impasse, one area of research which was especially helpful 
was that devoted to negotiator cognition and rationality. The 
works of Margaret Neale and Max Bazerman of Northwestern 
University are particularly noteworthy. In Cognit:ion and 
Rat:ionali t:y in Negot:iat:ion, Neale and Bazerman introduce a new 
5 
area of research in which the negotiation process is viewed as 
a multiparty decision-making activity, where the individual 
cognitions of each party and the interactive dynamics of 
multiple parties are seen as critical elements [Ref. 3:p. 1]. 
The central argument of their book is that to negotiate most 
effectively negotiators need to make more rational decisions. 
Making such decisions requires that negotiators understand and 
reduce the cognitive errors that pervade their decision 
processes [Ref. 3:p. 1]. The importance of this research to 
the study of the impasse is the premise that irrational 
decision-making reduces the quality of negotiated agreements, 
and increases the probability of an impasse. 
Howard Raiffa discusses the concept of the bargaining 
"zone of agreement" and the "best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement," or BATNA [Ref. 4:pp. 44-45]. Both are useful 
concepts when examining the impasse. If a positive zone of 
agreement does not exist; that is, the buyer's max~ price 
exceeds the minimum price the seller will accept, then no 
agreement is possible. In determining a maximum or minimum 
price, the buyer/seller should consider his BATNA, or what 
will happen if no agreement is reached [Ref. 4:pp. 44-45]. A 
rational negotiator should accept any agreement which is 
superior to his BATNA. However, empirical research by Neale, 
Bazerman and many others demonstrate that negotiators do not 
always make rational decisions, and that an impasse may result 
even when there is a positive zone of agreement. 
6 
Another relevant area of research when studying the 
impasse is the framing of issues, and the dilemma between the 
distributive and integrative aspects of negotiating. Dean 
Pruitt, William Bottom and Amy Studt, and Neale and Bazerman 
have performed valuable research in this area. A purely 
distributive approach is associated with a •win-Lose" 
mentality in which one party's gain is at the direct expense 
of the other party. An integrative, or •win-Win• approach 
involves examining the relative preferences or interests of 
the parties and "trading off" lower priority items for higher 
priority items. In general, integrative agreements can 
produce more joint gain than purely distributive agreements. 
In the context of the impasse, a pair of negatively framed 
negotiators will fail to reach agreement more often than a 
pair of positively framed negotiators [Ref. 5:p. 471]. 
Many other research efforts have provided valuable 
background for the instant research. Chester Karrass, Wayne 
Barlow and Glenn Eisen have explored the use of impasse as a 
negotiation tactic (Ref. 6:pp. 195-196] [Ref. 7:p. 159]. Roy 
Lewicki has examined the issue of lying and deception in 
negotiations [Ref. 8:pp. 68-88]. w. Clay Hamner investigated 
the effects of bargaining strategy and pressure to reach 
agreement in a stalemated negotiation [Ref. 9:pp. 458-466]. 
Neale and Bazerman, Roderick Kramer, Elizabeth Newton and 
Pamela Pommerenke have studied the impact of negotiator 
7 
overconfidence on the negotiation process [Ref. 10:pp. 34-47] 
[Ref. 11:pp. 110-129]. 
This research was designed to determine how an impasse 
scenario develops in the course of real-world contract 
negotiations. Three hundred thirty five questionnaires were 
sent to Department of Defense (DOD) and defense industry 
negotiators. Of the 335, 212 were returned, for a response 
rate of 63t. Of these, 104 respondents (62 DOD and 42 
industry negotiators) indicated that they had experienced an 
impasse. The questionnaire contained 33 yes-no, scaled, and 
open-ended questions. Average time to complete the 
questionnaire was estimated at 20 to 25 minutes. Respondents 
were given the option to remain anonymous, although they were 
encouraged to provide their names and phone numbers for 
follow-on questioning as necessary. In addition to asking 
questions concerning the impasse and related factors, 
respondents were asked to indicate how long they had been a 
negotiator; whether they negotiated on behalf of the 
Government or industry; and whether they were the buyer or the 
seller. 
As the data were accumulated, statistical analyses were 
performed, comparing the means and standard deviations of the 
various questions. The principal comparison was between DOD 
and industry negotiators. 
8 
G. DBPDJI'l'IOBS 
A contract negotiations impasse is defined as a case where 
two negotiators ultimately fail to reach an agreement. This 
is not the same as a stalemate, which is a temporary 
"stalling" point. A negotiation which reaches an impasse may 
include periods of stalemate, but not necessarily so. This is 
not to say that the two organizations will never reach an 
agreement. It is possible that two different negotiators 
negotiating on behalf of the same organizations (e.g., Naval 
Air Systems Command and Lockheed Corporation) will 
subsequently reach an agreement. The impasse is defined at 
the individual negotiator level vice the organizational level, 
and it is a terminal event. Two individual negotiators going 
head to head are unable to ever reach an agreement. 
B. ORGANIZA'l'IOlf OP '1'BB S'l'ODY 
Chapter I introduces the purpose and general direction of 
the research. It also addresses the objectives of the 
research. The research question, scope and limitations made 
in the research are described, with a brief literature review 
and the research methodology outlined to conclude the chapter. 
Chapter II presents the theoretical framework within which 
the research was conducted and analyzed. Chapters III, rv 
and V present and analyze the data. Chapter III focuses on 
demographic data, negotiator definitions of the contract 
9 
negotiations impasse, and impasse-relevant facets of the 
contract pre-negotiation phase of negotiations. Chapter rv 
concentrates on the active negotiation phase and Chapter v on 
its conclusion: the impasse. Finally, Chapter VI will present 
the conclusions and recommendations of the research. 
10 
II. TDORftiCAL raAIIBWOU 
A. Dl'l'RODUCTIOR 
This chapter is designed to present the theoretical 
framework within which the research was conducted and 
analyzed. It is organized into 13 sections, excluding the 
introduction and summary. The first section will discuss the 
findings of a thesis written by Robert Bennett which studied 
simulated negotiations and their effectiveness on negotiated 
outcome. Subsequent sections will discuss zones of agreement 
and best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATRA); the 
use of impasse as a negotiation tactic; distributive and 
integrative approaches to negotiation; balance of negotiator 
power; trust and deception; negotiator overconfidence and 
aspiration level; reactive devaluation of concessions; 
perspective-taking ability (PTA); personality conflicts; 
pressure to reach agreement; non-rational escalation of 
conflict; and anchoring and adjustment. Each of these are 
important to an analysis of the impasse because they have been 
identified through previous research as key factors which 
increase the likelihood of a negotiations impasse, although 
not necessarily a contract negotiations impasse. 
ll 
------------------------------------------------------~----------~~~·~-
B. SDitJLATBD DGOTIATIOHS .um TIIB DIP USB SCBD.Il.IO 
Robert Bennett's thesis studied simulated negotiations and 
their effectiveness on negotiated outcome [Ref. 12:pp. 136-
143]. Of the 139 negotiations conducted, nineteen resulted in 
an impasse. Of the nineteen, Bennett was only able to obtain 
data from seven of the negotiations. Both the buyer and 
seller were asked to complete a questionnaire which sought to 
ascertain the reasons for the impasse. Because of the limited 
responses, Bennett was unable to draw any definitive 
conclusions to account for the impasse in general. However, 
he noticed several patterns which he considered possible 
explanations for the impasse scenario. These factora were, 
(1) a general unwillingness to negotiate, (2) unrealistically 
high or low initial offers, (3) a proclivity toward a 
particularly high or low price, (4) lack of an overlap between 
the buyer's maximum price and the seller's mintmum price (a 
negative zone of agreement), (5) a breakdown in communication, 
and (6) personality conflicts. [Ref. 12:pp. 136-143] 
Bennett's limited study of the impasse scenario provided 
the impetus and starting point for the instant research 
effort. 
C. ZONE OP AGRBBIIBN'T AND BATNA 
The concepts of a "best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement" (BATNA) and a "zone of agreementft have important 
implications for a study of the contract negotiations impasse. 
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To illustrate, consider the following buyer-seller scenario 
developed by Raiffa (1982) [Ref. 4:pp. 44-45]: One negotiator 
wants the value to be high--the higher the better--whereas the 
other wants the value to be low--the lower the better. Each 
negotiator will determine as best he can the decision problem 
he or she faces if no contract is made, that is, his BATNA. 
The seller has a reservation price, s, that represents the 
very minimum he will settle for; any final-contract value that 
is less than this price represents a situation for the seller 
which is worse than no agreement. The buyer also has a 
reservation price, b, that represents the very maximum he will 
settle for; any final-contract price that is greater than b 
represents a situation for the buyer that is worse than no 
agreement. If s < b, then the positive zone of agreement is 
the interval from s to b. However, if b < s, that is, if the 
maximum price the buyer will pay is lower than the minimum 
price the seller will settle for, there is a negative zone of 
agreement [Ref. 4:pp. 44-45]. Thus, as Bennett's thesis 
indicates, one very basic reason a contract negotiation 
impasse may occur is because a positive zone of agreement does 
not exist. 
Pinkley, Neale and Bennett examined how differential power 
among negotiators (in the form of BATNAs) influences the 
parameters, the process, and the outcome of the negotiation. 
Their experiment involved first-year M.B.A. students. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two role 
13 
conditions--recruiter or candidate--and to one of three BATNA 
conditions--high, low, or no BATNA. They hypothesized that 
the highest rate of impasse would occur in negotiations where 
both parties had high BATNAs and the lowest rate of impasse in 
negotiations where both parties had no BATNAs. Surprisingly, 
there was no discernable impact of BATNA on impasse rate. It 
must be noted, however, that the study did not involve 
practicing contract negotiators nor contract negotiations. 
[Ref. 13:p. 114] 
D. USB OP IMPASSB AS A RBGOTIA'l'IOH 'l'AC'l'IC 
Karrass states that impasse is one of the most powerful 
tactics in negotiation, and that there is almost nothing that 
so tests the strength and resolve of an opponent [Ref. 
6:pp.195-196]. Impasse is frustrating. People who reached an 
impasse in Karrass' experiments were frustrated. They were 
angry: angry at each other, angry at Karrass, angry at their 
teammates and angry at the time limits imposed on them. They 
were unhappy. In the real world, impasse is worse. It leads 
to a sense of failure [Ref. 6:pp.195-196]. Similarly, Barlow 
and Eisen declare that properly handled, the threat of impasse 
can be a powerful tool in the hands of an astute negotiator. 
However, the risk is great, because the threat creates 
hostility that must be defused immediately, and the negotiator 
who threatens the impasse must be able to live with the 
14 
consequences if the tactic fails and an actual walkout takes 
place [Ref. 7:p.l59]. 
B. DISTR.IBtrl'IVB ARD Drl'BGRATIVB APPROACBBS TO DGOTIATIOHS 
All contract negotiations involve the distribution of 
outcomes. Negotiations with only a single issue are purely 
distributive in character. The total amount of resources to 
be divided is fixed; one party's gain is at the direct expense 
of the other party. This approach is commonly referred to as 
Win-Lose. [Ref. 3:pp. 20-21] 
If a negotiation involves more than one issue, then a 
search for ways to increase the amount of total gain available 
to the parties becomes feasible by exploiting the differences 
in the parties' preferences. Each party trades lower priority 
issues for higher priority issues. This is the integrative 
approach to negotiation. The degree of integration achieved 
by an agreement can be defined as a measure of the relative 
efficiency of the negotiated agreement in allocating the 
available resources. Integrative agreements occur through the 
creative search for ways to increase the size of the total pie 
available for distribution to both parties. This approach is 
commonly referred to as Win-Win. [Ref. 3:pp. 23-24] 
The two approaches are quite different. Probably the 
biggest difference is the flow of information between the 
parties. A negotiator employing a Win-Lose approach often 
does not trust the other side and seeks to minimize the 
15 
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release of any information which may reduce his advantage in 
the distributive d~ension. Unfortunately, this is the 
opposite approach to achieving integrative agreements. Each 
party must make its preferences known to the other so that 
issues of lesser value can be traded for those of greater 
value. [Ref. 3:p. 29] 
Whether the negotiation is seen in a distributive or an 
integrative light may be affected as much by the experience 
level of the negotiator as the nature of the bargaining 
situation itself. Inexperienced negotiators often assume a 
fixed-pie perspective on negotiations and act as if all 
negotiations are distributive. Expert negotiators are much 
more likely to see the integrative potential of a particular 
negotiation. [Ref. 3:p. 92] 
Pruitt states that negotiators who have a Win-Lose 
orientation often employ contentious behavior designed to 
elicit concessions from the other party. Contentious behavior 
is assumed to militate against the formation of integrative 
agreements, and there are four reasons why this should be true 
[Ref. 14:p. 47]: 
• Contentious behavior ordinarily involves 
standing fir.m on a particular proposal that 
one seeks to force upon the other party. 
This is incompatible with the flexibility 
required for fashioning integrative 
agreements. 
• Contentious behavior encourages hostility 
towards the other party by a principle of 
psychological consistency. This diminishes 
one's willingness to contribute to the 
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other's welfare and hence one's willingness 
to devise or accept jointly beneficial 
alternatives. 
• Contentious behavior encourages the other 
party to feel hostile and engage in 
contentious behavior in return. 
• Contentious behavior calls into question the 
possibility of achieving a jointly beneficial 
agreement. That is, it tends to reduce the 
integrative potential perceived by the other 
party. 
The implications seem clear: A Win-Lose orientation 
engenders ~ontentious behavior, which can elicit contentious 
behavior in return. It seems logical that adopting a purely 
distributive approach to negotiations carries with it a 
greater risk of impasse. 
Bottom and Studt studied the framing of negotiations 
(positive or negative), and its effect on the distributive 
aspect of integrative bargaining [Ref. 5 :p. 459]. The 
significance of framing on negotiations arises in classifying 
an alternative as a potential gain or a loss. Negotiators 
behave in a more risk-averse manner when evaluating potential 
gains (positive frame), and in a more risk-seeking fashion 
when evaluating potential losses (negative frame) . In 
negotiation, the risk-averse course of action is to accept an 
offered settlement; the risk-seeking course is to hold out for 
future, potential concessions [Ref. 3:p.44]. In their study 
involving 68 M.B.A. candidates, Bottom and Studt found that 
contrary to the view taken in earlier framing studies, 
negatively framed negotiators generally did better than their 
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positively framed counterparts in most situations. However, 
negatively framed negotiators experienced a higher rate of 
impasse [Ref. 5:p.459]. 
P. BALAHCB OP NBGOTl:ATOR POWBR 
The balance of negotiator power affects overall 
negotiation strategy and the tactics employed against an 
opponent. In Purchasing Negotiations, Barlow and Eisen detail 
several sources of purchasing negotiator power, including: 
[Ref. 7:pp. ~43-~48] 
• Knowledge. The more knowledge a negotiator 
has and can project, the more power he can 
bring to bear against an opponent. 
• Buyer's reputation. A history of fair 
dealing, knowledge, and concern for people 
translates into power. 
• Economic factors. The size of the contract 
and its significance to the seller are 
reflected in the perception of power by both 
parties. 
• Power rests in the relative proficiency of 
parties to negotiate. 
• Position or rank within the organization. 
The higher the rank, the more power a 
negotiator possesses. 
• Competition. The competitive forces in the 
marketplace significantly affect the balance 
of power to the buyer and seller. A buyer 
who has attractive alternative sources (a 
high BATNA) has more power than if the 
supplier is the sole source of an item. 
In Give and Take, Karrass asserts that sellers can gain a 
measure of power at the buyer's expense because buyers are 
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usually restricted in their ability to use competitive sources 
for the following reasons [Ref. 15:p. 155]: 
• Some sources are located too far away. 
• Some sources have bad track records. 
• Sources have differing abilities and 
capacities to produce. 
• Sources have preferences of production or 
engineering personnel. 
• Specifications which limited sources. 
The concept of negotiator power has implications in the 
study of the impasse. McAlister et al. (1986) developed a 
laboratory simulation of a market in which they varied supply 
and demand in order to manipulate buyers' and sellers' power 
[Ref. 16:pp. 278-279]. Buyers and sellers had either equal 
power or unequal power. Consistent with their hypotheses, 
they found that high power negotiators received a greater 
share of the profits than did low power negotiators and that 
joint profit was higher in the equal power than in the unequal 
power conditions. However, in the markets in which buyers 
and sellers had equal power, five of 218 negotiations ended 
with no agreement; in the markets in which power was unequal, 
so of 198 negotiations ended in impasse. So, while high power 
negotiators typically get a bigger piece of the pie vis'-a-
vis' a low power negotiator if an agreement is reached, they 
are much more likely to fail in reaching an agreement. [Ref. 
16:pp. 278-279] 
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G- TRUST AND DBCBPTIOH 
The process of achieving an agreement is based on 
"information dependence." At the outset of negotiation, each 
party knows only his or her own preferences. Advantage in 
negotiation is obtained by independent but related processes: 
successful determination of the opponent's preferences and 
priorities, while disguising one's own preferences and 
priorities [Ref. ~4:p. 69-70]. On the one hand, concerns for 
trust, honesty and integrity are essential to a successful 
negotiating relationship; on the other hand, deception and 
disguise of one's true position are essential to maximizing 
profit. A negotiator's principal motivation to deceive is to 
increase his power over his opponent, primarily through the 
manipulation of information. Naturally, one party's 
perception of deception or attempted deception on the part of 
his opponent will make achieving an agreement more difficult, 
therefore, negotiations involving parties who distrust each 
other seem more likely to end in impasse than those where a 
certain amount of trust is present. [Ref. ~4: p. 69-70] 
H. NBGOTIA'l'OR OVBRCONPIDDCB AND ASPIRATION LBVBL 
Another reason negotiators may reach an impasse despite 
the objective existence of a zone of agreement concerns the 
overconfidence with which negotiators evaluate their judgment 
and its effect on their aspiration levels. In Karrass' 
experiments, negotiators with high aspirations deadlocked more 
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than those with lower aspirations [Ref. 6:p. 196]. Barlow 
and Eisen caution against giving any concession without being 
fully aware of its tactical and economic impact, because 
concessions affect the balance of power due to their impact on 
the aspiration levels of the parties [Ref. 7:p. 149]. 
Neale and Bazerman demonstrated that negotiators typically 
overestimate by 15 percent the probability that, under final-
offer-by-package arbitration, their final offer will be 
accepted by the arbitrator [Ref. lO:p. 38]. That is, while 
only SO percent of all final offers submitted to the 
arbitrator can be accepted, the average subject estimated that 
there was a much higher probability that his or her own offer 
would be accepted. Thus, overconfidence may inhibit a variety 
of settlements, even when reaching an agreement is in the 
parties' best interests, because negotiators may avoid 
accepting agreements falling short of their aspirations [Ref. 
lO:p. 38]. Although this argument was developed relative to 
an industrial relations perspective, it can be legitimately 
generalized to suggest that any joint venture may fail to 
occur as each side is overconfident that the other side will 
eventually give in to one's own "superior" position/argument. 
I. RBAC'riVB DEVALUATION OP CORCBSSIONS 
Concessions are instrumental in reaching agreements. 
Unless both negotiators' initial stated positions are 
identical, one or both negotiators have to offer concessions 
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in order to strike a deal, otherwise an impasse results. In 
the process of exchanging concessions, one concept is that of 
reactive devaluation. 
Reactive devaluation is the inclination for opposing 
parties to devalue each other's concessions simply because it 
is the opponent who offered the concession. A number of 
explanations have been offered to explain reactive 
devaluation, including [Ref. 3:pp.75-77]: 
• One party may deduce that the opponent places 
less value on what is being given up than on 
what can be gained in exchange. 
• The specific concession increases 
negotiator's aspirations. 
the 
• The concession may be discounted for 
psychological consistency based on balance 
theory. That is, the concession is worth 
less because it was declared by a negative 
source--the opponent. 
• Interpretations about the basis for the 
concession, omissions, or uncertainties are 
apt to be interpreted malevolently. 
• The mythical fixed-pie syndrome: "what is 
good for the opponent is bad for us." 
It is probable that reactive devaluation is specifically 
pertinent to negotiations with negotiators perceived as "the 
enemy." Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989) found that 
individuals who perceived themselves to be in negative 
bargaining relationships assigned positive utility to outcomes 
in which the other side received comparatively less. This was 
true whether the focal negotiator's outcomes were positive or 
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negative. However, this effect was nonexistent in positive 
bargaining relationships. These findings imply that reactive 
devaluation is a direct reaction to the opponent gaining 
something that it said it wanted. [Ref. 3:pp.75 - 77] 
Reactive devaluation of concessions may increase the 
likelihood of impasse because opposing negotiators downplay 
the magnitude of each other's concessions. A major concession 
made by one negotiator is evaluated as a minor concession by 
his opponent, who holds out for even bigger concessions, and 
vice-versa. 
J. PBRSPBC'l'IVB-TAltiHG ABILITY (PTA) 
Experience and empirical evidence indicate that there are 
some negotiators who are more accurate in their interpersonal 
judgments and better able to objectively assess an opposing 
negotiator's position [Ref. 17 :p. 50]. These individual 
differences may be related to the ability of a negotiator to 
take the perspective of his or her opponent. In the 
bargaining context, it is expected that individuals with high 
PTA would be better able to adopt the perspective of their 
opponents. This added information from perspective-taking 
should increase one's ability to predict accurately the 
opponent's goals and expectations. This is extremely 
important in devising negotiating strategy and facilitating 
compromise. Neale and Bazennan found that perspective-taking 
ability positively affects the concessionary tendencies of 
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negotiators and the likelihood that an agreement will be 
reached [Ref. 17:p. 50]. Conversely, a negotiator possessing 
relatively little PTA should have more difficulty in 
accurately determining his opponent's negotiating position, 
and consequently be more prone to reaching an impasse. 
1t. PBRSONALI"l'Y CONFLICTS 
Siegel and Fouraker (1960) observed that negotiations 
often collapse when one party becomes angry with the other and 
attempts to •maximize his opponent's displeasure rather than 
his own satisfaction• [Ref. 3:p. 161]. Loewenstein et al. 
(1989) devised an experiment which manipulated the emotion 
that one party felt toward the other party at three levels: 
positive, neutral, and negative [Ref. 3:p. 163). When a 
relationship shifted from positive to negative, the parties 
shifted towards selfishness: they became more concerned with 
their own payoffs and were more accepting of advantageous 
inequity, or the •big piece of the pie• [Ref. 3:p. 163]. In 
Bennett' s experiments, several negotiators who failed to reach 
agreement acknowledged that personality conflicts played a 
significant role in reaching an impasse [Ref. 12:p. 143]. 
L. PRBSSURB TO RBACB AGRBBIDD1'1' 
Hamner conducted an experiment involving undergraduate 
business students designed to determine the effectiveness of 
various bargaining strategies under stalemate conditions [Ref. 
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9:pp. 458-466]. He found that when subjects were faced with 
high pressures to reach agreement, they took fewer trials to 
reach agreement, had a higher concession rate, and reached 
agreement more often than subjects who faced low pressure to 
reach agreement [Ref. 9:p. 458]. Thus, a negotiator under 
little or no pressure to reach an agreement may be more apt to 
adopt a relatively •tough• bargaining style under stalemate 
conditions. While the tougher bargainer has the potential of 
making a higher profit than his opponent, he runs the risk of 
extinguishing his opponent's conciliatory behavior and not 
reaching an agreement. 
II. NOII·RATIOHAL BSCALATIOII 01' CORI'LICT 
While this phenomenon is well-known in the collective 
bargaining arena, it has implications for contract 
negotiations as well. Staw (1976) provided the initial 
evidence of the escalation effect [Ref. l7:p. 48]. He 
constructed an experiment involving subjects designated as 
either high-responsibility or low-responsibility decision-
makers. The subjects were given a scenario in which they had 
to allocate funds to one of two corporate divisions. They 
were then told that, after a period of three years, the 
investment had either proved profitable or unprofitable, and 
that they faced another funds allocation decision concerning 
the division to which they had earlier given funds. When the 
result of the previous decision was poor, high-responsibility 
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subjects gave significantly more funds to the original 
division than the low-responsibility subjects. Based on this 
escalation phenomenon, negotiators can be expected to stand 
pat on their opening proposals through the course of ensuing 
negotiations. [Ref. 17:p. 48] 
Bazerman(1990) states that non-rational escalation occurs 
for several reasons [Ref. 3:p. 69]: 
• Once negotiators make an initial commitment, 
they are more likely to notice information 
that supports their initial evaluation. 
• A negotiator's judgment information will be biased to 
a way that rationalizes 
position. 
of any new 
construe it in 
the existing 
• Negotiators often make subsequent decisions 
to justify earlier decisions to themselves 
and others. 
• The competitive context adds to the 
likelihood of escalation. It is easier for a 
negotiator to escalate commitment to a 
position and leave the future uncertain than 
accept a sure loss by conceding. 
The negotiation process aggravates the nonrational 
escalation of commitment. This process often leads both 
parties to make extreme opening demands. The escalation 
literature predicts that if negotiators become bound to these 
initial public statements, they will nonrationally take a 
nonconcessionary stance [Ref. 3:pp. 69-70]. Consequently, the 
phenomenon of escalation can contribute to a negotiation 
ending in impasse. 
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H. ANCHORING MD ADJUS'l'KBH'l' 
Studies have found that people estimate values for unknown 
objects or events by starting from an initial anchor value and 
adjusting from there to yield a final answer. These anchors 
are typically based upon whatever information, relevant or 
irrelevant, is available [Ref. 3:p. 48]. 
Anchoring can affect the negotiation process in several 
ways. First, it can partially explain the importance of 
initial offers. Rubin and Brown (1975) note that early moves 
are critical in shaping the negotiation [Ref. 3 :p. 49]. 
Research has shown that final agreements are shaped more by 
initial offers then by subsequent concessions (Leibert, Smith, 
Hill, and Keiffer, 1968; Yukl, 1974). [Ref. 3:p. 49] 
Second, it can explain one of the causes of impasse when 
a positive zone of agreement exists: Negotiators may often 
confuse their objective, or target positions with their 
minimum positions. A negotiator should prefer any agreement 
that is marginally better than his minimum position. However, 
if negotiators only assess their target positions, then, once 
set, this target can become an anchor from which the 
negotiator is unable or unwilling to sufficiently adjust. 
[Ref. 3 :p. 49] 
0. SlDIIIU.Y 
This chapter has addressed the myriad of factors which may 
contribute to an impasse. While most of the existing 
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negotiation research has not addressed contract negotiations 
specifically, all of the factors discussed appear relevant to 
the contract negotiations setting. The purpose of the instant 
research is to determine if, and to what extent, these factors 
are perceived by practicing contract negotiators to be 
relevant to contract negotiations. Chapter III will present 
and analyze the demographic data and negotiator definitions of 
the contract negotiations impasse, as well as explore several 
impasse-relevant aspects of the contract pre-negotiation phase 
of negotiations. Chapter IV will concentrate on the active 
negotiation phase and Chapter v on its conclusion: the 
contract negotiations impasse. Finally, Chapter VI will 





The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the 
demographic data and negotiator definitions of the contract 
negotiations impasse, as well as explore several impasse-
relevant aspects of the contract pre-negotiation phase of 
negotiations. Although the pre-negotiation phase will be the 
primary focus, discussion and analysis will not be strictly 
limited to this phase. 
In addition to demographics and the definition of an 
impasse, topics for presentation and analysis include 
perception of seller's risk, trust and deception, negotiator 
power, and tactics and strategy. Because the examination and 
comparison of how DOD and defense industry negotiators view 
each of these areas is a critical aspect of this research, 
the data will be categorized into those two groups. Each 
section will present the relevant questions; the purpose of 
the questions; data presentation; and individual and 
comparative analyses of DOD and industry negotiator responses. 
The data will not be presented in numerical order, but 
rather by topic area. For those questions requiring a short 
answer, a sampling of the most common responses will be 
provided, starting with those most often cited. For those 
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questions requiring an assignment of numerical value, a 
statistical analysis will be provided, citing the ~. 
Standard Deviation, Range, and MQ.de. Mystat statistical 
software package was used to compute the statistical values. 
As stated earlier, these data will be presented under the two 
major headings of DOD and industry negotiators. 
This study is based upon the responses of sixty-two DOD 
and forty- two industry contract negotiators who had 
experienced an impasse. While the overall quality of the 
responses received was fairly good, not all questionnaires 
were filled out with lOOt accuracy. When possible the 
individual respondents were contacted for purposes of 
clarification, however this was not always possible due to the 
anonymous nature of the questionnaire. Thus, in the data 
presentation and analysis to follow, the total number of 
responses received to a particular question will usually be 
somewhat less than the total number of questionnaires received 
from DOD and industry negotiators. For example, question #3 
elicited only 57 responses (vice 62) from DOD negotiators; and 
only 40 responses (vice 42) from industry negotiators. 
B. DBIIOGRAPHICS 
1. Introduction 
There were only a limited amount of demographic data 
collected. The questions included in this section provide the 
30 
means to breakdown this study into the two main groups of 
interest: DOD and Defense industry negotiators. 
2. Questions 
There are two questions included in this section. 
Only the data received from respondents who indicated that 
they had experienced an impasse are included: 
OQESTIQN #3. How long have you been a negotiator (in 
years)? 
Pu%llOSe: The purpose of this question was to 
determine the experience level of contract negotiators who had 
experienced an impasse. 
QUESTION #4. Do you negotiate contracts on behalf of 
the Goverr~ent or industry? 
Pux:pose: The purpose of this question was to provide 
information necessary to segregate questionnaires into the two 
major groups of this study: 
negotiators. 
3. Results 
a. Question #3 
~ 
0-3 yrs ~ 
4-6 yrs 1. 
7-10 yrs .a 
11-15 yrs ll 
16+ yrs ll 
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b. QuestiOil 114 
DOD Negotiator: ~ 
Defense industry negotiator: !A 
4. Analysis 
a. DOD 
As expected, most negotiators who had encountered 
an impasse were relatively experienced. Only 10.5% of the 
negotiators having experienced an impasse were considered 
"inexperienced;" with inexperienced being defined as a 
negotiator possessing three years or less of negotiation 
experience. 
Two hundred fourteen questionnaires were sent to 
DOD activities. Out of one hundred forty nine responses 
received, sixty-two negotiators, or 41.6% indicated that they 
had experienced an impasse. It is very difficult to place a 
meaningful confidence interval around this percentage, 
although it is probably less. That is because, based on 
personal experience, the majority of the sixty-five 
negotiators who did not return the questionnaires probably did 
so because they had not experienced an impasse and thus 
believed their responses would be of no use to the researcher. 
b. .Industzy 
Not surprisingly, contract negotiators who 
indicated they had experienced an impasse were relatively 
experienced. Of the negotiators stating they had experienced 
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an impasse, 42. 9t had 16 years or more negotiating experience. 
zero inexperienced negotiators had encountered an impasse. 
One hundred twenty one questionnaires were sent to 
defense industry activities. Out of sixty-three responses 
received, forty-two negotiators, or 66.7t indicated that they 
had experienced an impasse. As with DOD negotiators, the 
actual percentage is probably less. Also, about 1St of the 
questionnaires were sent to negotiators known in advance to 
have experienced an impasse. 
5. Comparative Analysis 
Industry negotiators who had experienced an impasse 
were relatively more experienced than DOD negotiators. This 
is of no consequence to the findings and recommendations of 
this study. 
The actual percentage of DOD-defense industry 
negotiations which end in impasse would be interesting to 
know, however it is impossible to determine based on the 
analysis presented in subsection 4 above. 
C. DBP:IN:I'l':ION OP A CONTRACT NBGO'l':IA'l':ION DIPASSB 
1. :Introduction 
This section will present, analyze and compare 
responses from DOD and industry negotiators concerning the 




There is one question included in this section. 
QUESTION #2. How do you define a contract negotiation 
Pur.pose: The purpose of this question was to 
determine how DOD and industry negotiators define an impasse, 
and provide the basis for a comparison between the two. 
3. Results 
a. Question #2 
DOD negotiators defined a contract negotiations 
impasse as follows: 
• Inability to reach agreement. 
• A difficult negotiation with no way out. 
• Neither party willing or able to make 
concessions so as to reach agreement. 
• Agreement could not be reached by 
negotiators; escalated to management level. 
• Deadlock. 
• No meeting of the minds. 
• A negotiation stalled over a period of three 
months. 
• Inability to reach agreement absent coercion 
(termination for default or claim) or threat 
to cancel the requirement. 
• Making or restating offer three times with no 
movement from the other side. 
• Either a deadlocked negotiation, or one which 
takes an inordinate amount of time and effort 
to complete. 
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Defense industry negotiators defined a contract 
negotiations impasse as follows: 
• The parties are unable to reach a mutually 
acceptable position. 
• A negotiation wherein the original 
negotiators cannot resolve differences and 
the deal must be elevated to a higher level 
for resolution. 




of the •chief negotiators• 
the negotiation and another 
brought in to break the 
• A deadlock; a negotiation in which there 
appears to be no way in which to reach an 
agreement between the parties. 
• Neither party will concede based upon company 
policies, FAR regulations or DAR regulations. 
• When parties reach incompatible positions 
which cannot be reconciled. 
• Both parties refuse to move from last 
position. 
• When the two sides become stalled and the 
direct parties have to resort to alternative 
courses of action. 
• Positions held by both negotiators that 
cannot be compromised. 
• An irrevocable obstacle to doing business 
resulting in the cancellation of an 
opportunity. 
• Parties not having a meeting of the minds, 
and thus no way of agreeing to an agreement 




As expected, the central theme of the vast 
majority of definitions of a contract negotiation impasse was 
the failure to reach agreement. The first six responses 
were the most conmon. Responses seven through ten are 
provided to show the range of definitions provided. Most DOD 
negotiators defined the contract negotiations impasse as it 
has been defined for the purposes of this study: two 
negotiators ultimately fail to reach an agreement. 
b. Industry 
Not suprisingly, the most common elements of the 
industry-provided definitions were the failure to reach an 
agreement, and escalation of negotiations to a higher level. 
Most industry negotiators defined the contract negotiations 
impasse as it has been for the purposes of this study: two 
negotiators ultimately fail to reach an agreement. 
5. Comparative Analysis 
Industry negotiators' definitions tended to be more 
homogeneous than the DOD negotiators' definitions. Still, the 
vast majority of both groups defined the impasse essentially 
as this study has; this means that the data provided ~Y the 
negotiators are based on a conmon definition of the contract 
negotiations impasse. 
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D. PD.CBPTION OJ' SBLI-BR' S lliSlt 
1. Introduction 
The negotiator's perception of the seller's risk and 
the type of contract being discussed have definite 
implications for the study of the contract negotiations 
impasse. It seems reasonable to surmise that the greater the 
buyer and seller's perceptions of the seller's risk differ, 
the farther apart their initial positions will be. 'Ihe type 
of contract being discussed is also germane, because of its 
risk-allocating properties. 
2. Questions. 
Questions #9, #10, and #13 are included in this 
section. 
QUESTION #9. Were you the buyer or the seller? 
Pu;:pose: This question was included to allow the 
responses to be segregated into those of buyers and sellers. 
QUESTION #10. What type of contract was being 
discussed: Fixed-Price or Cost-Reimbursement? 
pyrpose: The purpose of this question was to 
determine if one of these basic contract types is more liable 
to be involved in an impasse. Fixed-price contracts allocate 
more risk to the seller than do cost-reimbursement contracts. 
It seems logical that negotiations surrounding fixed priced 
contracts, especially firm-fixed-price, would be more prone 
to an impasse because of the seller's reluctance to make 
37 
significant concessions on price because they increase his 
risk. 
OQBSTION #13. How would you characterize the seller's 
(regardless of whether you were the seller or not) risk in 
terms of the performance of this contract? 
Pur:gose: The amount of risk the seller is accepting, 
or perceives he is accepting, should reflect in the seller's 
contract price objective. The buyer's perception of the 
seller's risk likewise influences his contract price 
objective. It is likely that the buyer and seller will differ 
in their estimations of the seller's risk, with the buyer 
estimating the seller's risk to be less than what the seller 
estimates his own risk to be. Thus, the buyer and seller may 
have a difficult time agreeing on price. Of course they may 
not be able to reach an agreement at all, in which case an 
impasse results . This question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 
representing low risk, and 5 representing high risk. 
3. Results 
a. Question #9. 
~ Industcy 
Buyers il ~ 
Sellers ~ ~ 
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)). Quest1oa #~O. 
~ Induat:cy 
Fixed Price Contracts: 
.5J. ll 
Cost Reimbursement Contracts: ~ ia 
c. Quest1oa #~3. 
I2QQ 
Hun Stan4ard Deviation Range ~ 
2.910 1.237 1 to 5 3 
Inciustry 
Hun StandArd Peyiation Rapge ~ 
3.702 1.143 1 to 5 4 
4. Analysis 
a. DOD 
Not surprisingly, every DOD contract negotiator 
was a buyer. 
Ninety-one percent of the contracts involved in a 
contract negotiation impasse were fixed-price. The percentage 
of negotiated contracts which were fixed-price within DOD in 
1992 was approximately seventy-five percent [Ref. l:p. 83]. 
The difference is significant; therefore, negotiations which 
contemplate the use of a fixed-price contractual instrument 
are more likely to end in an impasse than if a cost- type 
contract is being discussed. As stated previously, this is 
because of the price ceiling feature of a fixed-price 
contract. Since the seller is bearing lOOt of the performance 
39 
risk, he will be very reluctant to make price concessions 
which increase the odds that he may exceed the ceiling. 
Unlike a cost reimbursement contract, where the worst that can 
happen to the seller is that his fee will be zero (under an 
incentive or possibly an Award fee arrangement) , a cost 
overrun in a fixed-priced environment will be borne solely by 
the seller, and may be disastrous depending upon its 
magnitude. 
DOD negotiators viewed the seller's performance 
risk as medium. By itself, it does not mean much. However, 
when compared with the seller's self-assessment of risk, it 
will prove to be significant. 
b. Industzy 
As expected, nearly all of the defense industry 
negotiators were sellers. Although no data were collected 
regarding who the sellers' customers were, it is obvious from 
examining the questionnaires that nearly all were DOD buyers. 
Ninety percent of the negotiations ending in an 
impasse involved fixed-price contracts. As mentioned above, 
this is most likely because fixed-priced contract negotiations 
are usually more contentious than cost- reimbursement 
negotiations. In a cost-reimbursement environment, the 
seller's main concern is the size of the fee, because he knows 
that all his allowable and allocable costs will be reimbursed. 
This is not true of a fixed-price contract; every dollar of 
cost and profit is crucial from the seller's perspective. 
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Because fixed-price contracts allocate lOOt of the performance 
risk to the seller, the seller is more apt to strongly resist 
making concessions beyond a point where he feels fairly 
confident that he can perform the contract at a reasonable 
profit. As indicated by the responses to question #13, the 
seller generally believed that he was assuming a significant 
amount of risk, further stiffening his resistance to making 
significant price concessions. 
5. Comparative Analysis 
The fact that all DOD negotiators were buyers, and 
nearly all defense industry negotiators were selling to DOD 
allows for a direct comparison between the two groups on how 
each views the negotiation process, the contract negotiation 
impasse and each other. 
Negotiations ending in impasse were more likely to 
have involved a fixed-price contract than a cost-reimbursement 
contract. This is because a fixed-price contract is far 
riskier to the seller than a cost- reimbursement contract. 
Also, in analyzing the results to question #13, it is apparent 
that sellers (industry) perceive their own risk as being 
significantly higher than the buyer's (DOD) perception of the 
seller's risk. This is a fundamental catalyst of the impasse 
scenario. The amount of risk that the seller assumes under a 
contract is one of the basic determinants of how much profit 
or fee the seller merits. The seller's mean response to 
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question #13 was 27t greater than that of the buyer, 
indicating a rather large difference in the perceived risk to 
the seller. The larger this difference is, the farther apart 
the negotiators' positions will be at the onset, and the 
greater the chance that the compromise necessary to achieve an 
agreement will fall short of the mark. 
That differences in perception of the seller's risk 
exist between buyer and seller were not at all surprising. 
Contract negotiations, and negotiations in general, are 
fertile ground for biases to take root. The buyer generally 
believes the seller's risk to be less than what the seller 
believes it to be, because to do so favors his position. The 
same rationale holds true for the seller: he believes his 
risks are greater than what the buyer gives him credit for 
because it favors his position. The contract negotiation 
process, and negotiations in general, are subject to the 
foibles of human nature. The biased perceptions of the 
seller's risk is a good example of this. 
B. TRUST AND DECEPTION 
1. Introduction 
This section will examine the concepts of trust and 
deception within a contract negotiations context. As Lewicki 
(1983) pointed out in his article Lying and Deception, 
concerns for trust, honesty and integrity are essential to a 
successful negotiating relationship. However, deception and 
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disguise of one's true position are essential to maximizing 
one's "benefit of the bargain." A negotiator's principal 
motivation to deceive is to increase his power over his 
opponent, primarily through the manipulation of information 
[Ref. 14: p. 69 -70] . One would naturally assume that a 
negotiation based on trust would reduce the probability of an 
impasse as opposed to negotiations involving negotiators who 
do not trust each other. 
2. Questions 
Included in this section are questions #8, #14 and 
#26. 
OQESTIQN #8. To what extent have the impasses you've 
experienced involved, in whole or in part, some measure of 
deception or attempted deception on the part of your opponent? 
py~ose: Deception, or attempted deception, breeds 
distrust. Negotiations involving parties who distrust each 
other seem more likely to end in impasse than those where a 
certain amount of trust is present [Ref. 14: p. 69-70].The 
question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 representing little 
deception, and 5 representing a great amount of deception. 
QUESTION #14. Had you negotiated previous contracts 
with the opposing negotiator? 
Pumose: The purpose of this question was to 
determine if and how previous negotiations with the same 
negotiator affected negotiator's perceptions of deception and 
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level of trust regarding their opponent. A pair of 
negotiators who have never negotiated a contract with each 
other enter the negotiation with less preconceived notions of 
each other's trustworthiness than a pair of negotiators who 
have met at the negotiating table previously. 
QUESTION #26. To what degree did you trust the 
opposing negotiator? 
Puroose. As stated in question #14, negotiations 
involving parties who distrust each other seem more likely to 
end in impasse than those where a certain amount of trust is 
present [Ref. 14: p. 69-70}. The question was scaled 1 to 5, 
with 1 representing little trust, and 5 representing a great 
amount of trust. 
3. Results 
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DOD negotiators believed that a medium amount of 
deception was pre~ent in the impasse negotiations which they 
had experienced. So, while they felt that some deception 
existed, they did not feel that it was ubiquitous. 
The results of question #26 indicate that a medium 
level of trust between opposing negotiators is normally 
present. So, while negotiators generally do not feel that 
their opponents are consistently lying through their teeth, 
neither do they completely trust them. 
To determine the influence, if any, that previous 
negotiations had on a negotiator's level of trust of his 
opponent, the responses to question #26 were broken down by 
"yes" and "no" responses to question #14. While the mean 
response to question #26 of negotiators who had previous 
negotiations with their opponent was 11% higher than the mean 
response of two negotiators who had never faced each other 
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before, the difference was not statistically significant. 
This indicates that previous dealings with one's opponent does 
not significantly build trust. That the mean responses were 
not significantly different was not completely unexpected, 
because negotiators' previous dealings with their opponents 
may just as well have been negative experiences as positive. 
The resulting negative and positive responses to question #26 
would then cancel each other out, leaving the mean nearly 
unchanged. What was surprising is that this turned out not to 
be the case. The standard deviation of the responses to 
question #26 of negotiators who had previous dealings with 
their opponent was actually smaller than those who had no 
previous dealings with their opponent. It seems that previous 
dealings with one's opponent did little to alter the level of 
trust placed with the opponent, positive or negative. This 
suggests that negotiators base their level of trust of the 
opponent more on the instant negotiation than on previous 
dealings with that opponent. Perhaps this is because 
negotiators believe that it makes good business sense to not 
blindly trust the opponent based on previous positive 
dealings, nor patently distrust based on previous negative 
dealings with that opponent. As was stated before, DOD and 
industry negotiators seem to realize that there must be some 
level of mutual trust between two negotiators in order to 
fashion an agreement, but that placing too much trust in one's 
opponent can be dangerous. 
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b. Industry 
Industry negotiators believed that a medium amount 
of deception was present in impasse negotiations which they 
had experienced. So, while negotiators felt that some 
deception was present, they did not feel that it was all-
pervasive. 
Almost 55% of negotiators answered "yes" to 
question #14, meaning they had previous dealings with their 
opponent. While this fact is not important in and of itself, 
it does permit a comparative analysis of question #26 between 
those negotiators who had previous dealings with their 
opponent versus those who had not. 
The responses to question #26 indicate that 
negotiators place a medium level of trust in their opponent. 
As stated earlier, this reinforces the maxim that negotiators 
realize they have to trust each other to a certain degree in 
order to strike an agreement, but are wary of placing their 
complete trust in their opponent. 
Surprisingly, there was no significant 
relationship between previous negotiations with an opponent 
and the level of trust placed in the opponent. Negotiators 
evidently base their trust on their opponent's actions in the 
instant contract negotiation, discounting the outcomes of 
previous dealings. 
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P. Campara ti ve Analysis 
A comparison of responses to question #8 reveals a small 
but statistically significant difference between DOD and 
industry negotiators in the perceived measure of deception 
involved in impasse negotiations. DOD negotiators' responses 
were on average 15% greater than those of industry 
negotiators. This difference may be due not so much to the 
DOD vs. industry aspect of the negotiation as it may be due to 
the buyer vs. seller aspect. It seems that the buyer is 
naturally more wary of the seller than vice-versa. The old 
phrase "caveat emptor, " or, "let the buyer beware, " reinforces 
this notion. 
The difference may also be due in part to cultural 
differences between DOD and industry. It may be that DOD and 
industry negotiators' perceptions differ as to what deception 
is, and what types and amounts of deception are within 
acceptable bounds in a contract negotiation. 
DOD and industry mean responses to question #26 were 
nearly identical. This was surprising in light of their 
responses to question #8. Because DOD negotiators felt that 
deception was more prevalent in impasse negotiations, one 
would have thought that their responses to question #26 
regarding trust would have been lower than industry's 
responses, but such was not the case. 
OVerall, the findings in this section do not have any 
meaningful implications for the contract negotiations impasse. 
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The results were pretty much as expected: negotiators take 
"middle of the road" positions on issues of trust and 
deception in contract negotiations. 
G. NBGOTIATOR POWBR 
1. Introduction 
The concept of negotiator power is relevant to the 
study of the impasse. McAlister, et al. , developed a 
simulation of a market in which they varied supply and demand 
in order to manipulate buyers' and sellers' power. They found 
that while negotiators possessing more power generally fared 
better than their opponents, they also had more negotiations 
end in an impasse [Ref 16:pp. 278-279]. Thus, one would 
expect the majority of impasse negotiations to involve 
negotiators possessing unequal power. The questions in this 
section are designed to determine the perceived balance of 
power between buyer (DOD) and seller (industry). 
2. Questions 




Was this a sole or single sou::-ce 
Purpose: The purpose of this question was twofold: 
One purpose was to help determine the balance of negotiator 
power. A competitive environment would favor the buyer, while 
a sole or single source environment would favor the seller. 
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The second purpose was to determine if one environment, 
competitive or sole/single source, was more prone to end in an 
impasse than the other. It seems reasonable to expect that 
they would be equally prone to an impasse, because the 
presence of competition favors the buyer, and the absence of 
competition favors the seller. This was a yes/no question. 
OUESTIQN #16. Do you believe that your aspirations 
were at such a high level that it led to the impasse? 
py~ose: In Karrass' experiments, negotiators with 
high aspirations deadlocked more than those with lower 
aspirations [Ref. 6:p. 196]. The purpose of this question is 
to ascertain whether or not negotiators felt that their 
aspiration level may have been a contributing factor to the 
impasse. The question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 representing 
strong disagreement and 5 representing strong agreement. 
QUESTION #21. How much pressure did you feel under 
from your organization to reach an agreement? If your answer 
was "4" or "5," please briefly describe the cause of this 
pressure. 
py~ose: Empirical evidence has demonstrated that 
the amount of pressure a negotiator perceives he is under to 
reach an agreement will have a bearing on whether or not an 
agreement is struck. Hamner found that when subjects were 
faced with high pressures to reach agreement, they took fewer 
trials to reach agreement, had a higher concession rate, and 
reached agreement more often than subjects who faced low 
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pressure to reach agreement [Ref. 9 :p. 458]. Thus, one would 
expect that a negotiation which ended in an impasse would 
involve negotiators under relatively little pressure to 
settle. In effect, the greater the pressure placed upon the 
negotiator to settle, the less negotiation power he actually 
possesses. The first part of the question was scaled 1 to 5, 
with 1 representing low pressure and 5 representing high 
pressure. The second part of the question was open-ended. 
OQESTION #22. How did you perceive the balance of 
negotiator power prior to negotiations? 
Purpose: McAlister, et. al., (1986) found that while 
high power negotiators typically get a bigger piece of the pie 
vis' -a-vis' a low power negotiator if an agreement is reached, 
they are much more likely to fail in reaching an agreement 
[Ref. 16 :pp. 278-279]. Thus, one would expect that most 
negotiations ending in an impasse would involve negotiators 
possessing unequal power. The question was scaled 1 to 5, 
with l representing negotiator power favoring the opponent, 
and 5 favoring the respondent. 
QUESTION #23. During negotiations, did your perception of 
your own negotiation power change? If yes, in what direction? 
QUESTION #24. During negotiations, did your perception of 
your opponent's negotiation power change? If yes, in what 
direction? 
Purpose: The purpose of these two questions was to gain 
insight into the power dynamics inherent in a negotiation 
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headed for an impasse. One would expect a negotiator's 
perception of the balance of power to move in favor of his 
opponent if he perceived the balance of power to be in his 
favor prior to negotiations, and to move in his favor if he 
perceived the balance of power to be in his opponent's favor 
prior to negotiations. This is based on the supposition that 
a negotiator who thinks he has the upper hand prior to 
negotiations will feel his power diminish as the negotiations 
drag on and his opponent refuses to •cave in• to his 
"superior" position. Likewise, a negotiator who feels that 
his opponent has the upper hand prior to negotiations may 
realize after negotiations begin that his opponent is not as 
powerful as previously thought, and feel his perceived power 
increase. 
3. Results 
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c. Question 112~ 
Standard Deviation Bange 
3.557 1.162 1 to 5 3 
Causes of Organizational Pressure CDQDl 
3.452 
• Contract had to be awarded to meet project 
goals. 
• Impending expiration of funding. 
• Necessity to replenish inventory. 
• Procurement was in support of a program with 
substantial Congressional interest. 
• Maintain reasonable procurement 
administration lead time (PALT). 
• Management wanted to avoid criticism/pressure 
from project office. 
• Management's belief that an impasse was 
counterproductive and the seller's position 
must be reasonable. 
• Contractor had a strong track record of 
success with the Armed Services Board of 
Appeals (ASBCA). 
Industry 
Stan4ard Deviation Range 
1.268 1 to 5 3 
53 
Causes of Organizational Pressure Cin4usttY) 
• Economic: settle or oee yourself unemployed! 
• Internal division pol::ics. Marketing, sales 
and production departments wanted the job at 
any risk/cost to the company. 
• Division was experiencing cash-flow strain. 
• Lay off people - no jobs - no booking - no 
revenue - no company! 
• Company had commenced work on this contract 
under their own "risk" money because they 
were certain the Government would put them 
under contract . There was great pressure 
within the company to get under a definitized 
contract. 
• Progress payments were limited due to 
undefinitized status of the letter contract. 
• Need to retain or obtain business in a 
declining market. 
• Booking/billing objectives. 
• The product had already been delivered to the 
Government. Company had been unable to bill 
any of the costs on the order. 
• Unrealistic targets or goals. 
• Negotiator helped set the minimum position; 
feels "stupid• when he can't reach his 
objective. 
• Concern that the prolonged negotiations might 
endanger other negotiations; pressure to 
settle for reasons not directly connected 
with the issues being negotiated. 
• Until the proposal was negotiated, the 
changes could not be made to hardware, 
holding up production. Lots of pressure from 
company's program management to reach 
agreement, but had to be above the bottom 
line dollar figure. 
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Surprisingly, nearly 90% of the negotiations 
involved a seller who was a sole or single source. This 
percentage is significantly higher than the 38% of negotiated 
contracts which were sole or single source within DOD in 1992 
[Ref. 1:p. 83]. A possible explanation is that the sole or 
single-source power of the seller is offset in many cases by 
the monopsony power of the Government: the Government is the 
sole customer for many military-unique products and weapon 
systems. This could explain the mean value of the responses 
to question #22, which indicated that negotiator power was 
perceived to be nearly dead-even, despite the fact that ninety 
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percent of the time the DOD negotiator faced a sole/single 
source seller. 
The responses to question #16 indicate that DOD 
negotiators generally did not believe that their aspirations 
were at such a high level that it led to the impasse. While 
this is admittedly a somewhat "loaded• question, the results 
tend to be validated by the mean response to question #22, 
which indicated that DOD negotiators felt the balance of power 
to be equal. It doesn't appear that negotiator overconfidence 
was a major factor in reaching an impasse. 
Although the responses to question #21 were 
unexpectedly high, another question designed to measure the 
amount of organizational pressure to reach agreement in 
general would have permitted a useful comparison with question 
#21. It may be that DOD negotiators felt relatively less 
pressure to reach agreement in the instances where they 
reached an impasse. However, the responses to the open-ended 
portion of question #21 tend to refute this: it is hard to 
imagine a more intense source of pressure to reach agreement 
than one which several negotiators stated: congressional 
interest in the program. 
The causes of the pressures to reach agreement 
were largely as expected: the most common pressures cited 
were the necessity to support project/program goals in a 
timely fashion, expiration of funding, and Congressional 
interest. Interestingly, several negotiators described a 
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"between a rock and a hard place" scenario, in which upper 
management applied considerable pressure upon the negotiator 
to reach agreement on highly visible programs, then criticized 
the negotiator for "caving in• in order to reach an agreement 
during the post-negotiation review process. The negotiator 
felt he was in a •no-win• situation. This could be another 
reason why negotiators reached an impasse despite the presence 
of considerable organizational pressure to reach an agreement. 
They saw the prospect of being criticized for not reaching an 
agreement as a "lesser of two evils" vis' -a-vis' being 
criticized for reaching an unfavorable agreement. 
The responses to question #22 indicate that a 
majority of negotiators, 62%, perceived that there was an 
unequal balance of negotiator power prior to the commencement 
of negotiations. An examination of questions #23 and #24 in 
conjunction with question #22 revealed that 65% of negotiators 
perceived that there was an unequal balance of power during 
negotiations. These findings appear to weakly confirm the 
research of McAlister, although it would have been useful to 
have included a question concerning the perceived balance of 
negotiator power of a negotiation which ended in an agreement 
for comparison purposes. 
Question #22's mean response of 3.016 was 
unexpectedly low. DOD negotiators do not seem to be guilty of 
overconfidence, as they judged the balance of negotiator power 
to be essentially equal overall. 
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Approximately forty percent of the DOD negotiators 
perceived a shift in negotiator power during contract 
negotiations. Comparing the mean responses to questions #21 
and #22 between those who perceived a positive power shift and 
those who perceived a negative power shift revealed a 
significant difference. Negotiators who perceived their power 
to decrease during negotiations felt more pressure to reach 
agreement than those who felt that their power increased 
during negotiations. It appears that negotiators under 
greater pressure to reach agreement felt their power ebbing 
away once it became clear that reaching an agreement would be 
difficult. The fact that an impasse occurred despite this 
perceived loss of power may be attributable to the phenomenon 
cited earlier: the negotiator may choose to accept criticism 
for not reaching an agreement rather than be criticized for 
striking a relatively disadvantageous agreement. 
Unexpectedly, the mean response to question #22 
was higher for negotiators who felt the negotiator power shift 
in their favor than for those who felt the power shift in 
their opponent's favor. That is, relatively powerful 
negotiators felt negotiator power shift even more in their 
favor despite the fact that they were ultimately unable to 
reach an agreement. This may be due to how DOD negotiators 
define "negotiator power." Maybe the negotiators felt that 
the facts brought out during the course of negotiations 
strengthened their position and hence their power, even though 
58 
the strength of their position was not enough to cause their 
opponent to capitulate. They did not feel that their power 
decreased merely because they were unable to reach an 
agreement. 
b. Industry 
The percentage of negotiations involving a sole or 
single source was almost 93%, which was much higher than 
expected. The likely reason for this is that the monopsony 
power of the Gove::nment is an effective counterbalance in many 
instances. This would explain the fact that industry 
negotiators felt the balance of negotiator power prior to 
negotiations was essentially equivalent, despite the fact that 
they were a sole/single source. 
The responses to question #16 show that industry 
negotiators generally did not believe that their aspiration 
level contributed to the impasse. This result is bolstered by 
the mean response to question #22, which indicated that 
negotiators felt the balance of power to be nearly dead even. 
If the mean response would have been higher, say 3 . 5 or 
greater, then the mean response to question #16 would be 
subject to question since higher negotiator power normally 
equates to higher aspiration levels. As far as can be 
discerned from the data, negotiator overconfidence was not a 
major ingredient of the impasse scenario. 
As was the case with DOD negotiators, the 
responses to question #21 were unexpectedly high, considering 
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Hamner's research [Ref. 9:pp. 458-466]. While it would have 
been useful to collect and comparP. data on the degree of 
organizational pressure industry negotiators feel under in 
general with the responses to question #21, the comments 
provided concerning the cause of the pressures indicate that 
the negotiators were indeed under extraordinary pressure in 
many instances. 
The causes of the pressures to reach agreement 
were largely as expected. Although articulated in many 
different ways, the number one pressure was economic: the 
contractor needed business in order to maintain sufficient 
cash-flow, avoid layoffs and maintain a viable organization. 
So why did these negotiations end in impasse despite the great 
pressures to reach agreement? The probable answer, as in the 
case of the DOD negotiators, is that negotiators frequently 
felt n trapped" by the pressure not only to reach an agreement, 
but to reach a favorable agreement. The negotiator, forced to 
"choose his poison, n chose no agreement over a poor agreement, 
leaving the task of settling to his superiors. This is an 
important point: many of these contract negotiation impasses 
were ultimately settled at a higher level in the organization. 
Several of these negotiations involved major weapon systems 
worth millions if not billions of dollars: the stakes were of 
sufficient size for both DOD and the defense industry 
activities that an agreement was going to be reached at some 
level within the organizations. 
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As predicted, the responses to question #22 reveal 
that 60% of negotiators felt that there was an unequal balance 
of power prior to negotiations. An examination of questions 
#23 and #24 shows that nearly the same percentage, 58%, 
believed that there was an unequal balance of power during 
negotiations. These findings appear to support the research 
of McAlister, although not very strongly. 
The mean response to question #22 reveals that 
negotiators were not overconfident of their relative 
negotiator power; perceiv_ ~g it to be nearly dead-even. 
Comparing the responses to questions #21 and #22 
of negotiators who felt the balance of power shift in their 
favor versus those who felt it shift in their opponent's 
favor, did not reveal a statistically significant difference. 
s. Comparative Analysis 
A comparison of responses to these questions reveals 
a startling similarity between DOD and industry negotiator 
responses including: 
• A preponderance of sole/single 
contract negotiations. 
source 
• General disagreement that their aspiration 
levels were at such a level that it led to 
the impasse. 
• Significant organizational pressure to reach 
agreement. 
• Perceived negotiator power to be nearly 
perfectly balanced between buyer and seller. 
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It appears that negotiations involving sole/single 
sources are much more prone to an impasse than in a 
competitive environment. Although a sole source procurement 
enhances the negotiator power of the seller, the overall 
balance of power was adjudged by both DOD and industry 
negotiators as being equal. As stated earlier, this is 
probably because the sole or single-source power of the seller 
is offset in many cases by the monopsony power of the 
Government: the Government is the sole customer for many 
military-unique products and weapon systems. While this 
reasoning may seem to contradict McAlister's findings which 
indicated that negotiations involving parties with unequal 
negotiator power are more prone to an impasse, this isn't 
necessarily so. In fact, while the mean responses to question 
#22 may have indicated equal negotiator power overall, the 
majority of individual contract negotiations involved 
negotiators possessing unequal negotiator power. 
While DOD and industry negotiators perceived nearly 
equal levels of organizational pressure to reach agreement, 
the causes of the pressure were different, although 
predictable. The most common pressures placed upon DOD 
negotiators were mission related, such as the urgency to field 
a weapon system or replenish inventory; workload related, such 
as reducing backlogged procurements; or oversight related, 
such as program office and congressional interest. In 
contrast, the industry's chief pressures centered on economic 
62 
issues, such as cash-flow, avoiding layoffs, and ensuring the 
viability of the corporation. 
Many DOD and industry negotiators felt that they were 
in a "no win" situation, in that not only were they under 
considerable pressure to reach an agreement, but a favorable 
agreement. As the negotiations progressed and it became 
obvious that a favorable agreement was not forthcoming, the 
negotiators opted for an impasse, rather than agree to a deal 
falling short of management's aspirations. It seems that 
conflicting pressures from management in both DOD and industry 
contribute to an impasse negotiation. 
Probably the most striking similarity involves the 
mean responses concerning balance of negotiator power. 
Ideally, the sum of the mean responses of DOD and industry 
negotiators to question #22 would equal 6.000. For example, 
if the DOD negotiators' mean response was 3.5, then ideally 
the industry negotiators' mean response would be 2.5. This 
would mean that both groups were in full agreement regarding 
the relative balance of power, since from the DOD negotiator 
perspective the industry negotiators' power equals 6 - 3.5 = 
2. 5, which equals the industry negotiators' perception of 
their own power. The same logic would hold true from the 
industry negotiators' perspective. 
In the instant research, the sum of the mean responses 
is 6.113, which differs from the ideal sum of 6.000 by less 
than two percent. Therefore, both DOD and industry 
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negotiators were very objective in their assessment of 
negotiator power. 
B. TACTICS AND STRATBGY 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to explore the roles 
that negotiation tactics and strategy play in the impasse 
scenario. One negotiation tactic in particular will be 
examined, which is the threat of deadlock. The threat of 
deadlock is a double-edged sword in that it can be a powerful 
tool in the hands of an astute negotiator, but it has the 
potential to backfire with potentially serious consequences, 
the most serious of which is an impasse. 
The way in which a negotiator views the contract 
negotiation process has implications for the study of the 
contract negotiations impasse. Negotiators who have an 
integrative, or Win-Win perspective of negotiations actively 
employ creative problem-solving techniques in order to expand 
the size of the total "pie" available for distribution to both 
parties [Ref. 3 :pp. 23-24]. In contrast, negotiators who have 
a purely distributive, or Win-Lose, orientation often employ 
contentious behavior designed to elicit concessions from the 
other party [Ref. 14:p. 47]. The implication seems clear: A 
Win-Lose orientation employs contentious behavior, which can 
elicit contentious behavior in return. It seems logical that 
negotiations involving negotiators with a Win-Lose orientation 
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would be more prone to reaching a contract negotiations 
impasse than a negotiation involving two negotiators with a 
Win-Win orientation. 
2. Questions 
This section will examine the responses to questions 
#17, #19 and #20. 
OYESTION #17. Did you or your opponent use the threat 
of deadlock as a negotiation tactic? 
Purnose: The purpose of this question is to ascertain 
how prevalent the use of this contentious tactic is in 
negotiations which ultimately end in an impasse. It is 
logical to surmise that a significant number of impasses will 
have involved the use of this tactic. Further, one would 
predict that negotiators would indicate that their opponent 
used this tactic far more often than they used it themselves. 
OVESTION #19. How would you characterize your 
negotiation strategy with respect to your objectives/goals, 
and the negotiation process itself (i.e. Win-Win, Win-Lose)? 
QUESTION #20. How would you characterize your 
opponent's bargaining strategy with respect to his 
objectives/goals, and the negotiation process itself (i.e., 
Win-Win, Win-Lose)? 
Purpose: A negotiator who views the negotiation 
process as a Win-Win opportunity brings to the negotiating 
table a more integrative, problem-solving approach than one 
65 
who focuses solely on the distributive aspects of the 
negotiation. A Win-Lose orientation engenders contentious 
behavior, which can elicit contentious behavior in return. It 
seems logical that adopting a purely distributive approach to 
negotiations carries with it an increased risk of impasse. 
The questions were open-ended. 
3. Results 
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As expected, negotiators felt that the threat of 
deadlock had been employed by one or both parties in half of 
the negotiations. Not surprisingly, negotiators felt that 
their opponents used this tactic more than twice as often as 
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they did themselves. Recognizing that the threat of deadlock 
is perceived to be a contentious tactic, negotiators generally 
felt that their opponents were much more likely to •start 
trouble" than they were themselves. 
The responses to questions #19 and #20 were not 
surprising. Ninety-five percent of DOD negotiators said that 
their strategy was Win-Win. In contrast, fully two-thirds of 
the negotiators felt that their opponents were employing a 
Win-Lose strategy. Thus, a significant majority of the 
negotiators felt that while they were attempting to craft an 
integrative agreement which would benefit both parties, their 
opponent was only "looking out for number one." 
It would have been useful to have collected data 
with respect to DOD negotiators' perspective of their 
opponents' negotiation strategies in general. However, there 
is no denying that a vast majority of DOD negotiators 
perceived that they were the "good guys" and that their 
opponents were the "bad guys." This perception seems to be a 
major factor in the contract negotiations impasse scenario. 
b. Industzy 
The responses to question #17 indicate that 
industry negotiators felt that their opponents used the threat 
of deadlock three times as often as they used it themselves. 
This was expected, since use of the threat of deadlock is 
generally recognized as a contentious tactic and a potential 
"negotiation-ender." 
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Industry negotiators stated that this tactic was 
used by one or both negotiators in over 60t of negotiations. 
Since the threat of deadlock was used in a majority of 
negotiations which ended in an impasse, it should be regarded 
as a significant contributing factor to the occurrence of an 
impasse. 
OVer 90t of industry negotiators said that they 
employed an integrative Win-Win strategy. Sixty-two percent 
of industry negotiators believed that while they employed a 
Win-Win strategy, their opponents employed a Win-Lose 
strategy. These results are not surprising: one would have 
expected, based on an understanding of human nature, that a 
negotiator would view himself as the •good guy• and his 
opponent as the "bad guy,• if there was one. The majority of 
negotiators believed that their opponents were most 
responsible for the negotiations ending in an impasse. 
5. Comparative Analysis 
Both DOD and industry negotiators believed that their 
opponents employed the threat of deadlock far more than they 
did themselves. Of course, both sides cannot be correct. For 
instance, DOD negotiators indicated that they used the threat 
of deadlock in 18t of negotiations, while industry said DOD 
negotiators employed it in sot of negotiations. Likewise, 
industry negotiators indicated that they used the threat of 
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deadlock in 17t of negotiations, while DOD believed industry 
used this threat far more often: 40t. 
Why is this so? Most likely, this is due to 
inadequate conununication between the parties. One negotiator 
said something not intending it to be a threat, however his 
opponent interpreted it as a threat. Whether or not it was a 
threat is not relevant, since it is the perceptions of the 
negotiators which really matter. If a negotiator believes he 
is being threatened, he will usually respond in kind. Thus, 
an often "innocent" statement by a negotiator may promote an 
unintended escalation of conflict, and ultimately cause an 
impasse. Therefore, negotiators should be very careful about 
what they say and how they say it. Further, they should 
verify that what they have said has been understood by their 
opponents. Lastly, they must be good listeners. They need to 
ensure that they clearly understand what their opponent has 
told them; asking questions if there are any ambiguities on 
what has been said. Without clear communication of 
information between the parties, the odds of an impasse become 
significantly greater. 
The same holds true for negotiation strategy. DOD and 
industry negotiators generally believe that they are the "good 
guys;" the ones working to establish an integrative framework 
and maximize the total possible gains available to both 
parties. Most negotiators also feel that their opponents are 
the "bad guys, " whose sole mission is to maximize their 
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outcomes. Obviously, they both cannot be right. While this 
scenario is undoubtedly accurate in some instances, most of 
the time it is probably due to the negotiators' perceptions of 
their opponents' actions. Again, negotiators must seek to 
eliminate their natural biases and objectively evaluate the 
actions of their opponents so as to avoid misunderstandings 
which may ultimately cause a contract negotiation impasse. 
I. Summary 
This chapter presented demographic data, various 
negotiator definitions of what a contract negotiation impasse 
is, and explored several impasse-relevant aspects of contract 
negotiations. The demographic data provided limited general 
information on both groups of negotiators, including which 
group the negotiator represented (DOD or industry) and 
experience level. 
While most of the aspects of negotiations discussed and 
analyzed in this chapter pertained to the realm of pre-
negotiations, they were not strictly limited to this one phase 
of the negotiation process. For instance, some elements of 
trust and deception, negotiator power, and tactics and 
strategy are relevant to other phases of the negotiation 
process. 
The factors which appear to be relevant to the contract 
negotiation impasse scenario include: 
• Fixed-price contract negotiations. 
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• Disagreement between DOD and industry negotiators over 
the level of seller's risk. 
• Sole/single source contract negotiations. 
• Organizational pressure to avoid an impasse, and reach 
a favorable agreement. 
• Frequent actual or perceived use of the threat of 
deadlock as a negotiation tactic. 
• Common perception that one's opponent has a Win-Lose 
negotiation strategy. 
Chapter IV will present and analyze data collected in 
response to questions designed to explore impasse-related 




The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the 
data collected in response to questions devised to explore 
several impasse-relevant aspects of the active contract 
negotiation phase of the negotiation process. Although the 
active negotiation phase will be the primary focus, discussion 
and analysis will not be strictly limited to this phase. 
The topics for presentation and analysis include conflict, 
concessionary behavior, and difficulty in reaching agreement. 
Because the examination and comparison of how DOD and defense 
industry negotiators view each of these areas is a crucial 
aspect of this research, the data will be categorized into 
those two groups. Each section will present the relevant 
questions, the purpose of the questions, data presentation, 
and individual and comparative analyses of DOD and industry 
negotiator responses. The data will not be presented in 
numerical order, but rather by topic area. For those 
questions requiring an assignment of numerical value other 
than the number of "yes" and "no" responses, a statistical 
analysis will be provided, citing the Mean, Standard 
Deviation, Range, and ~- Mystat statistical software 
package was used to compute the statistical values. T h i s 
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study is based upon the responses of sixty-two DOD and forty-
two industry contract negotiators who had experienced an 
impasse. Not all questionnaires were filled out with lOOt 
accuracy or completeness. When possible the individual 
respondents were contacted for purposes of clarification, 
however this was not always possible due to the anonymous 
nature of the questionnaire. Thus, in the data presentation 
and analysis to follow, the total number of responses received 
to a particular question will usually be somewhat less than 
the total number of questionnaires received from DOD and 
industry negotiators. For instance, question #12 elicited 
only 61 responses (vice 62) from DOD negotiators; and only 40 
responses (vice 42} from industry negotiators. 
As stated earlier, these data will be presented under the 
two major headings of DOD and industry negotiators. 
B. CONFLICT 
1. Introduction 
The objective of a contract negotiation is to reach a 
mutually satisfactory agreement. Unless the opposing 
negotiators possess identical positions er-tering into the 
negotiations, which is extremely unlikely, there will 
necessarily be sources of conflict which will need to be 
addressed and resolved if an agreement is to be reached. This 
conflict may not concern just the contractual elements, but 
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personality conflicts or clashes between the opposing 
negotiators. 
2. Questions 
Questions #5 and 6 are included in this section. 
OQESTION #5. Do ycu believe that impasses frequently 
are attributable to personality conflicts or clashes? 
PukPOSe: Siegel and Fouraker {1960) observed that 
negotiations often collapse when one party becomes angry with 
the other and attempts to "maximize his opponent's displeasure 
rather than his own satisfaction" [Ref. 3:p. 161]. This 
question was d~9igned to elicit the applicability of Siegel 
and Fouraker' s fi.ndings to contract negotiations involving 
practicing contract negotiators. This question was scaled 1 
to 5, with 1 representing strong disagreement, and 5 
representing strong agreement. 
QUESTION 16. Do you believe that most of the impasse 
negotiations that you have experienced involved a high amount 
of conflict as opposed to a low amount? 
Puroose: It seems likely that most negotiations 
ending in an impasse would involve more conflict as opposed to 
less conflict. That is, the greater the number of contentious 
issues, the greater the odds that one or more of these 
contentious issues will remain 'lnresolvedl resulting in an 
impasse. The question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 representing 
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a low amount of conflict, and 5 representing a high level of 
conflict. 
3. Results 
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Surprisingly, DOD contract negotiators did not 
feel that impasses were frequently attributable to personality 
conflicts or clashes. Several negotiators stated that, while 
personality conflicts can be a factor in a negotiation ending 
in an impasse, it is usually not the sole factor, or even the 
most significant factor. Most contract negotiators appear to 
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feel that, as professionals, they should not and must not let 
personalities get in the way of achieving mutually beneficial 
agreements. 
The researcher predicted that most negotiations ending in 
an impasse would involve a relatively high amount of conflict, 
however, the findings indicate that DOD contract negotiators 
generally believed that most impasse negotiations involved a 
medium level of conflict. A possible explanation is that the 
question was ambiguous as to the intended meaning of the word 
"conflict. " Perhaps the fact that this question directly 
followed a question (question #5) concerning personality 
conflict caused some negotiators to link "conflict" with 
"personality conflict". A more concise wording of the 
question would be, "Do you believe that most of the impasse 
negotiations that you have experienced involved a large number 
of contentious issues as opposed to a small amount?" 
b. IJldustzy 
The mean response to question #5 indicates that 
industry negotiators do not strongly feel that impasses are 
often attributable to personality conflicts or clashes. 
While it can be a contributing event within the impasse 
scenario, it does not seem to be a major detenninant of 
whether or not an impasse will occur. Evidently, industry 
negotiators are generally able to maintain a professional 
business relationship and ignore or minimize the damaging 
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consequences of allowing personality clashes to interfere with 
achieving a mutually beneficial agreement. 
As expected, industry negotiators felt that 
contract negotiation impasses involve a medium to high amount 
of conflict as opposed to a low amount. Since reaching an 
agreement necessarily involves resolving conflict, it seems 
likely that a negotiation involving more conflict is more 
likely to reach an impasse. 
s. Comparative Analysis 
DOD and industry negotiators' mean responses to 
question #5 were nearly identical, meaning contract 
negotiators in general do not believe that impasses are 
frequently attributable to personality clashes or conflicts. 
It appears that a "business is business" perspective of 
contract negotiations is commonly held amongst negotiators. 
Industry negotiators believed that impasse 
negotiations involved a greater amount of conflict than did 
DOD negotiators. The most likely explanation for this is that 
the vagueness of question #6 prevented DOD and industry 
negotiators from possessing a common understanding of what the 
question was attempting to communicate. Of course, lacking 
this common understanding, a comparison of DOD and industry 
mean responses is meaningless. Question #6 would have been 
much more effective in conveying its intent if it had been 
phrased as indicated in the preceding DOD analysis. 
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C. CONCBSSIONUY BBBAVIOR 
1. Introduction 
Concessions are instrumental in reaching agreements. 
Unless both negotiators have identical positions entering 
negotiations, one or both negotiators have to make concessions 
in order to strike a deal, otherwise an impasse will result. 
The concept of "reactive devaluation" embraces the inclination 
of opposing parties to devalue each other's concessions merely 
because it is the opponent who offered the concession. The 
questions in this section were designed to determine 
negotiators' perceptions concerning the presence or absence of 
concessionary behavior in a negotiation which ultimately ended 
in an impasse. 
2. Questions 
Questions #12 and 18 are included in this section. 
OUESTION #12. Regardless of whether you are a 
Government negotiator or not, do you believe that Government 
internal reports or audits influenced the Government 
negotiator's position such that he/she was unwilling to move 
from that position? 
PU:J:'i>OSe: This question was added to the questionnaire 
at the suggestion of a defense industry negotiator who 
believed that Government audits or reports often "anchored" 
DOD negotiators to positions from which they were unwilling to 
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make concessions necessary to achieving an agreement. 
was a yes/no question. 
This 
QUESTION #18. Who do you believe made the first major 
concession? 
Putpose. Concession-making and compromise are an 
integral part of negotiations. The purpose of this question 
was to determine if concessionary behavior, or a lack thereof, 
played a part in the negotiations ending in impasse. The 
possible responses were "You," "Your opponent," and •N/A.• 
3. Results 
a. Question #12 
~ Industr;y 
Yes ~ li 
No ll ~ 
b. Question #18 
~ Inciustcy 
You ~ 22 





While the •no's" outnumbered the "yes'" in 
response to question #12 by a two-to-one margin, the number of 
DOD negotiators who stated that Government internal reports or 
audits influenced their positions and inhibited concessionary 
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behavior was surprisingly high given the wording of the 
question, particularly the use of the phrase,•unwilling to 
move." The most likely explanation for this unwillingness to 
move is negotiator risk-aversion: they are reluctant to take 
the risk of moving from a position advocated by a Government 
internal repor~ or audit because of the possible consequences 
should their actions later be found to have been imprudent. 
This has serious implications for the impasse scenario, 
because a negotiation involving a negotiator who is unwilling 
to make concessions stands a significantly greater chance of 
ending in an impasse. The willingness to compromise is a 
necessary ingredient to reaching an agreement. 
The reactive devaluation of concessions concept 
asserts that negotiators. will often devalue an opponent's 
concessions for any of several reasons [Ref. 3:pp. 75-77]. 
The responses to question #18 support this concept: DOD 
negotiators believed that they had made the first concession 
nearly two-and-a-half times as often as their opponents. As 
was the case with the use of the threat of deadlock and the 
perception of negotiator strategy, negotiators usually viewed 
themselves as "good guys• and their opponents as "bad guys." 
This perception seems to be a major factor in the contract 
negotiations impasse scenario. 
b. Illdustzy 
Not surprisingly, the responses to question #12 
indicate that the vast majority, nearly 90%, of industry 
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negotiators surmise that internal Government reports or audits 
influenced the DOD negotiator's position such that he was 
unwilling to move from that position. They are of a mind that 
Government reports and audits strongly inhibit DOD negotiators 
from making concessions necessary to move towards an 
agreement. The strength of the industry negotiators' 
responses to this question marks it as a potentially 
significant factor in the impasse scenario. 
The responses to question #18 were likewise 
predictable: industry negotiators believed that they had made 
the first major concession more than twice as often as did 
their opponents. These results mirror the results of 
questions 17, 19 and 20 concerning the use of the threat of 
deadlock and negotiator strategy. A familiar scenario has 
developed where the industry negotiator generally views his 
own actions as rational and reasonable, and his opponent's 
actions as often being irrational, unreasonable, and 
detrimental to the negotiation process. This scenario is not 
unexpected, given the shortcomings of human nature. 
s. Comparative Analysis 
The responses to question #12 indicate that Government 
reports and audits have a strong impact on the concessionary 
behavior of DOD negotiators. To the extent that a report or 
audit presents a "fair and reasonable" position, their 
influence on the negotiator's position is not detrimental to 
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the negotiation process since the Government's objective is to 
pay a fair and reasonable price for the product or service 
being procured. However, to the extent that an inaccurate 
report or audit inhibits a negotiator from making a sound 
business decision, they are detrimental to the process. Of 
course, the negotiator is to blame if he strongly suspects 
that a report or audit is inaccurate but fails to challenge 
it. As stated above, the probable reason why most negotiators 
are unwilling to challenge Government internal reports or 
audits is risk-aversion: they are reluctant to take the risk 
of moving from a position advanced by a Government internal 
report or audit because of the possible consequences should 
their actions later be found to have been unwise. They 
evidently would rather risk not reaching an agreement than 
reaching an agreement which may be second-guessed by 
management or oversight activities. 
A comparison of responses to question #18 revealed 
a sharp difference of opinion concerning concessionary 
behavior. While both DOD and industry negotiators thought 
that neither had made a concession in about one-fourth of the 
negotiations, each believed that they made the first major 
concession far more than their opponents did. While this was 
expected, it is obvious that both parties cannot be correct. 
This is not unlike the results of questions 17, 19 and 20 
concerning the use of the threat of deadlock and negotiator 
strategy. The responses to these questions, as with the 
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responses to question #18, tended to portray the respondent as 
a rational and reasonable individual, and his opponent as just 
the opposite. It seems that reactive devaluation of 
concessions is prevalent in contract negotiations, and is a 
key factor in the unfolding of an impasse. 
D. Difficulty in Reaching Agreement 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of the questions in this section is to 
investigate the degree to which negotiators discerned that the 
negotiations at hand would be difficult, and at what point in 
the negotiations they realized that an in~asse was a distinct 
possibility. This is important to the study of the impasse 
because the data collected may provide insight into the 
ability of negotiators to objectively assess their opponent's 
positions, and the degree to which they feel confident {or 
overconfident) in reaching an agreement. 
2. Questions. 
This section will examine the responses to questions 
#15, 25 and 27. 
OQESTION #15. Upon entering negotiations, did you 
believe that there was a positive zone of agreement? A 
positive zone of agreement is that area where the minimum that 
the seller will accept and the maximum that the buyer will pay 
overlap. 
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Pu;:pose: The purpose of this question is to determine 
the proportion of contract negotiators who, prior to entering 
into negotiations, believed that there was a possibility of 
reaching an agreement. A negotiator who believed that such a 
zone did not exist would necessarily expect the negotiations 
to end in an impasse. This was a yes/no question. 
QUESTION #25. Prior to negotiations, what was your 
expectation regarding the potential difficulty of reaching an 
agreement? 
Pumose: Given that the negotiation ended in an 
impasse, the purpose of this question was to determine to what 
extent the negotiator recognized the difficulties which lay 
ahead in the negotiations. It is reasonable to presume that 
most negotiators would have expected a rather difficult 
negotiation, especially those who answered "no" to question 
#15. The question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 representing "not 
difficult," and 5 representing "difficult." 
OQESTION #27. At what point during negotiations did you 
become aware of the possibility of reaching an impasse? 
Pumose: The purpose of this question was to determine 
how early or late in the negotiation process contract 
negotiators perceived that an impasse was a distinct 
possibility. Ideally, a negotiator would recognize a 
potential impasse relatively early on, which would provide him 
adequate time to adjust his negotiation strategy and 
objectives accordingly. A negotiator who does not recognize 
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an impasse until relatively late may be a victim of his own 
overconfidence in his position and/or negotiating abilityi 
believing that the opposing party will •come to his senses• 
sooner or later. The question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 
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The data from question #15 indicate that over 
three-quarters of the negotiators (77%), believed that a 
positive zone of agreement did exist prior to negotiations, 
despite the fact that every negotiation ultimately ended in an 
impasse. This may be so for a couple of reasons: { 1) 
irrational negotiator behavior, such as negotiator 
overconfidence, reactive devaluation of concessions, or non-
rational escalation of conflict, prevented an agreement even 
though a positive zone of agreement existed; (2) inadequate, 
incomplete, or an otherwise flawed assessment of the opposing 
negotiator's best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA), possibly due to poor perspective-taking ability, 
caused the negotiator to believe that a positive zone existed 
when in fact one did not. 
As one would expect in a study involving 
negotiations which ended in impasse, the responses to question 
#25 indicate that negotiators generally anticipated that the 
impending negotiations would be somewhat difficult. So, 
while most negotiators believed that a positive zone of 
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agreement existed, they also realized that reaching an 
agreement would not be easy. 
The responses to question #27 indicate that 
negotiators saw the possibility of an impasse approximately 
halfway through the negotiation process. In a negotiation, 
the earlier the opposing parties detect the possibility of an 
impasse, the more opportunity they have to modify their 
negotiation objectives and strategy. These results indicate 
that while the possibility of an impasse was not detected 
extremely early in the process, there generally was some time 
available to modify negotiation objectives and strategies to 
facilitate an agreement. If so, why did these negotiations 
all end in an impasse? There may be many different reasons. 
Some were discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 
III. Others will be discussed L1 Chapter V. 
b. Industry 
The responses to question #15 indicate that nearly 
three-quarters of the negotiators (74%'), believed that a 
positive zone of agreement did exist prior to negotiations, 
despite the fact that every negotiation concluded with an 
impasse. As in the case of DOD negotiators, this may be so 
for a couple of reasons: (1) irrational negotiator 
behavior, such as negotiator overconfidence, reactive 
devaluation of concessions, or non- rational escalation of 
conflict, prevented an agreement even though a positive zone 
of agreement existed; (2) inadequate, incomplete, or an 
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otherwise flawed assessment of the opposing negotiator's best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) , possibly due to 
poor perspective-taking ability, caused the negotiator to 
believe that a positive zone existed when in fact one did not. 
As one would expect in a study involving 
negotiations which ended in impasse, the responses to question 
#25 indicate that negotiators generally predicted that the 
upcoming negotiations would be somewhat demanding. So, while 
most negotiators believed that a positive zone of agreement 
existed, they also realized that reaching an agreement would 
not be uncomplicated. 
The responses to question #27 indicate that 
negotiators perceived the prospect of an impasse roughly 
midway through the negotiation process. Clearly, the earlier 
the opposing negotiators notice the probability of a dead-end 
negotiation, the more opportunity they have to modify their 
negotiation objectives and strategy. These results indicate 
that while the possibility of an impasse was not detected very 
early in the process, there generally was some time available 
to revise negotiation objectives and strategy to promote an 
accord. If so, why did these negotiations all end in an 
impasse? Again, there may be many different reasons: some 
which have already been put forth, and some which will be 
advanced in the next chapter. 
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s. Comparative Analysis 
A comparison of the responses of DOD and industry 
negotiators to questions #15, 25 and 27 did not reveal any 
statistically significant differences between the two groups. 
This was not surprising, since none of these questions placed 
negotiators in the position of having to make "good guy/bad 
guy" judgments, as in the case of the preceding section on 
concessionary behavior. 
Sizeable majorities of both groups of negotiators 
believed that a positive zone of agreement existed prior to 
entering negotiations which would ultimately end in an 
impasse. As pointed out earlier this may be due to: ( l) 
irrational negotiator behavior, such as negotiator 
overconfidence, reactive devaluation of concessions, or non-
rational escalation of conflict, prevented an agreement even 
though a positive zone of agreement existed; (2) inadequate, 
incomplete, or an otherwise flawed assessment of the opposing 
negotiator's best alternative to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA), possibly due to poor perspective-taking ability, 
causing the negotiator to believe that· the positive zone of 
agreement was larger than it really was; or that a positive 
zone of agreement existed when in fact one did not. 
As expected, both DOD and industry negotiators 
correctly anticipated that negotiations would be a difficult 
challenge. Of course, they were right. 
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The responses to question #27 indicate that both 
groups of negotiators forsaw the possibility of an impasse 
while there was still time to modify their negotiation 
strategies and objectives accordingly. However, for whatever 
reasons the negotiations ultimately failed to reach an 
agreement. Some of these reasons have already been advanced 
and discussed, such as the reactive devaluation of 
concessions, disagreement over the level of the seller's risk, 
and the use of the threat of deadlock as a negotiation tactic. 
Others will be discussed in the next chapter, which will 
further examine the causes of an impasse, as well as how one 
may be avoided. 
B. SUDIIII&ry 
This chapter explored several impasse-relevant aspects of 
the active negotiation phase, including the presence and 
effects of conflict, negotiator perceptions of concessionary 
behavior, and the degree to which negotiators foresaw their 
difficulties in reaching an agreement. 
While most of the facets of negotiations discussed and 
analyzed in this chapter pertained to the domain of the active 
negotiation phase of the negotiation process, they were not 
strictly limited to this phase of the negotiation process. 
The sections which discussed conflict and the difficulty in 
reaching agreement both included elements which were relevant 
to other phases of the negotiation process. 
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The following factors which appear to be relevant to the 
contract negotiation impasse include: 
• Frequent unwillingness of DOD negotiators to 
move from positions advocated by internal 
Government reports or audits. 
• Reactive devaluation of concessions. 
• Inadequate, incomplete or otherwise flawed 
assessments of the opposing negotiator's 
BATNA, possibly due to inadequate 
perspective-taking ability. 
Chapter V will present and analyze data collected in 
response to mostly open-ended questions fashioned to explore 
the causes of the impasse, and elicit suggestions on how a 
contract negotiations impasse may have been avoided. 
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V. TBB IKPASSB 
A. IB'l'llOD'OCTIOH 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine DOD and industry 
negotiator responses to questions regarding the warning 
signals and cues of a contract negotiations impasse, and how 
an impasse may be avoided. 
Because a comparison of how DOD and defense industry 
negotiators perceive each of these areas is an important 
objective of this study, the data will be arranged into those 
two groups. Each section will present the relevant questions, 
the purpose of the questions, data presentation, and 
individual and comparative analyses of DOD and industry 
negotiator responses. This chapter will examine the 
negotiators' responses to five questions, four of which were 
open-ended. In the case of the open-ended questions, the most 
common responses will be provided, as well a sampling of the 
less typical responses. For the lone question requiring an 
assignment of numerical values, a statistical analysis will be 
provided, citing the ~, Stanciard peyiation, Range, and 
~- Mf'stat statistical software package was used to compute 
the statistical values. 
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B. CAUSBS OP TBB DIPASSB 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to present and analyze 
DOD and defense industry negotiators' responses to two open-
ended questions concerning the warning signals and causes of 
the impasse. These questions required the negotiators co 
state in specific terms their views on why the negotiations 
ended in an impasse. 
2. Questions 
Questions #28 and #29 are included in this section. 
QUESTION #28. Please identify the number one signal 
or cue (verbal and/or nonverbal) that alerted you to the 
possibility of an impasse, and describe how that signal or cue 
surfaced. Add any additional signals and cues if appropriate. 
Pu;mose: This was one of the major objectives of this 
study: to gain an awareness of the warning signs that an 
impasse may be in the offing. The question was open-ended. 
QUESTION #29. Briefly describe the factors which 
contributed to the negotiations ending in an impasse. 
Pu%l)ose: To require contract negotiators to 
explicitly state their perceptions regarding the primary 
causes of an impasse. 
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3. Reaults 
a. Question #28 
Answers received from DOD respondents, both verbal and 
non-verbal, are cited below. 
Verbal 
• "Nickel and diming. " Very small moves or 
counter offers in relation to the proposal 
value. 
• "Take it or leave it" offers or counter 
offers. 
• Opponent verbally threatened to walk out of 
negotiations. 
• Opponent stated: "Sorry, my company won't let 
me negotiate that overhead." 
• "Opponent's constant need to 'call back' to 
establish a new position. It indicated the 
level of authority of the negotiator." 
• "Opponent would not move from his position. 
Kept repeating the same argument." 
• "Opponent did not want to continue 
negotiating individual issues because, 
presumably, he believed that he wouldn 1 t 
reach his negotiation goal. Thus, my 
opponent wanted to deal only with 1 global' 
numbers." 
• Opponent refused to provide any back-up for 
his cost or method of arrival at price. 
• "Persistent use of words like 1 unable' and 
'can't'." 
• Opponent stated that he intended to involve 
his counsel and prepare claims for litigation 
if not satisfied. 
94 
··~· •' ~~ .... _ ·' ~ .-,;_ 
• Tone of voice of opponent indicated extreme 
frustration. 
Non-Verbal 
• Not returning phone calls. 
• Proposal far exceeded forward pricing rate 
agreement (PPRA). D~ also presented 
particular rates that conflicted with the 
opponent's proposal. 
• Silence {phone conversation). 
• Increased tension in the room. 
• Loss of eye contact, frustrated facial 
expressions. 
• Closing of books/papers. 
• •The fact that an issue which had surfaced in 
prior years but was mutually held in abeyance 
was now being vigorously pursued by my 
opponent.• 
• •The documentation the contractor provided 
supported the Government's position - not the 
contractor's, and when the contractor refused 
to make any significant movement in their 
position, it was clear that an agreement 
would not be reached.• 
• Opponent submitted multiple cost breakdowns 
with conflicting data. 
• •Presence of a new legal person on the 
opponent's negotiation team.• 
• Numerous breaks to consult with home office. 
• Opponent filed a legal claim against the 
Government before negotiations had even 
started. 
INDVSTRX 
Answers received from industry respondents, both 
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verbal and non-verbal, are cited below. 
Verbal 
• Opponent's extreme and rigid position. 
• Opponent refused to question the validity of 
a Government-internal assist audit. 
• "Opponent began sentences with words like 'I 
can't,' and 'I won't'." 
• Opponent's "take it or leave it" position. 
• Opponent stated that his position would not 
change regardless of the amount of additional 
information the seller could/would provide. 
• Opponent stated, "A deviation might be 
necessary to incorporate what you ask, which 
would delay this contract a minimum of three 
weeks.• 
• Opponent stated that he would be endangering 
his career if he did not •go along" with the 
Government-internal audit position. 
• "Opponent threatened to issue a unilateral 
change order to set the price.• 
• Opponent's extremely "low-ball" initial and 
first counter offer on fee. 
• "Opponent began the negotiation by 
criticizing our cost estimating system.• 
• Opponent stated that his negotiation limits 
were approved at a high level. 
• Opponent made accusations of defective 
pricing. 
• Opponent disclosed the dollar funding value 
of the purchase request. 
• Opponent's frustrated tone of voice. 
• Opponent's willingness to involve supervisory 
personnel in the negotiation. 
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Non-Verbal 
• "A negotiation which should have taken only a 
few hours stretched into three non-stop 
days." 
• Opponent's frequent caucuses. 
• Opponent's sharp, antagonistic attitude. 
• Opponent's arrogance. 
• Opponent did not return telephone calls. 
• "Opponent's shift from friendly, 




• Receipt of a unilateral change order. 
• Silence. Folded arms. 
• Opponent showed less and less interest to 
remain open to additional information. 
• Parties became tense; lack of eye contact. 
• Opponent walked out of the room. 
b. Question 129 
Answers received from DOD respondents are cited below. 
• Opponent became inflexible relative to his 
pricing position. 
• "Opponent's limited authority to commit his 
company, and his lack of standing within his 
organization to expand that authority." 
• "Opponent not willing to discuss issues with 
an open mind." 
• Differing perspectives of the risk of the 
work to be accomplished. 
• Opponent's lack of evidence in supporting his 
position. 
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• "Neither side was willing to reach a 
compromise since the difference between our 
positions was so large, and clearly much 
ground had to be given by both sides. It was 
apparent that higher level approval was 
needed to revise negotiation positions." 
• Parties had poor listening skills. 
• DCAA recommended position strongly disagreed 
with the contractor's proposal. 
• "Ongoing feud between the contractor and the 
Government. Neither side was willing to 
relent." 
• Absolute refusal by opponent to even discuss 
the issues other than to insist upon 
concessions. 
• Customer's lack of adequate funding. 
• "Contractor wanted to 'gold-plate' a change 
order." 
• "Contractor's position was extremely 
unreasonable. He basically wanted to turn a 
fixed-price contract into a cost-reimbursable 
contract." 
• "Corporate policy overriding reason and 
logic." 
• "The major factor was rates; actuals over a 
period of time indicating a trend, and the 
contractor's refusal to project according to 
the trend." 
• "The contractor was in a cash crunch and was 
trying to 'get well' on this contract." 
• Contractor thought Government would 
eventually "cave in" because of how important 
the project was. 
• "Poor position technically. The engineers 





Answers received from industry respondents are cited 
• Opponent's price expectations were 
unrealistic. 
• Seller's acceptance of a letter contract took 
leverage away from the seller. 
• The fact that the product had already been 
delivered. 
• Basic disagreement over the difficulty of the 
proposed task. 
• Failure of both parties to communicate 
objectives clearly. 
• Opponent's hardening of position which seemed 
to be based on emotion rather than reason. 
• Upper management limited the negotiators' 
abilities to settle. 
• Unrealistic goals. Targets did not change 
when additional facts were known. 
• "Opponent's concessions were consistently 
smaller than my own.• 
• "Opponent could have taken the effort to 
understand, and then discount, the DCAA 
audit's position.• 
• "Opponent appeared to be unable to deviate 
from DCAA's evaluation of our proposal." 
• Poor Request for Quotation (RFQ} instructions. 
• Different interpretation of FAR weighted 
guidelines analysis. 
• Government budget constraints versus seller's 
level of risk. 
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• "Opponent had much less historical data to 
support his position and felt that the large 
amount of data we were providing was being 




The responses to question #28 were largely as 
Many of the verbal and non-verbal signals 
identified support the earlier findings of this study, such as 
negotiators' differing perceptions of the seller's risk; the 
use of the threat of deadlock; the influence of Government-
internal audits and/or reports; poor communication between the 
parties; and the reactive devaluation of concessions. 
There were, however, additional impasse-related 
factors or signals which have not been previously discussed. 
One of the most frequently mentioned factors was the threat of 
litigation. The threat was communicated both verbally, as 
well as non-verbally by the presence of legal counsel during 
the negotiations. For obvious reasons, DOD negotiators 
considered the threat of litigation to be a clear signal that 
an impasse was plausible. 
Another frequently mentioned signal was the 
perception that one's opponent lacked sufficient authority to 
make essential business decisions. A lack of negotiator 
authority was evidenced not only verbally during negotiations, 
but non-verbally by the number of phone calls a negotiator had 
to make to his supervisors for guidance and approval. DOD 
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negotiators believed that negotiating with opponents 
possessing limited authority was a waste of time because of 
the likelihood that a potential agreement would be negated by 
the opponent's upper management, meaning that the negotiations 
would revert back to "square one." 
Delays in the negotiation process were also 
construed by DOD negotiators as a sign of trouble. The most 
frequently mentioned holdup was unreturned or lengthy delays 
in responding to phone calls or other correspondence. DOD 
negotiators took this to be a sign that the opposing 
negotiator was either: (1) was generally unhappy with the 
state of the negotiations; or (2) was attempting to use the 
passage of time to their tactical advantage in the case of 
urgently required supplies or services needed by the 
Government; or (3) lacked sufficient authority to settle. 
Many negotiators stated that their opponents' 
inability or unwillingness to provide adequate justification 
of their positions was a major catalyst of the impasse. The 
two most often cited instances of this sort were of an 
opponent who refused to provide any backup data for his 
position, and submissions containing conflicting or erroneous 
data. Successful negotiations necessarily entail a sufficient 
exchange of infonnation between the two parties. To the 
extent that one or both parties are unwilling or unable to 
effectively communicate their positions, the chances of an 
impasse are heightened. 
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Several negotiators said that their opponent's 
tone of voice was also a cue that the negotiation may be 
headed for an impasse. A tone of voice expressing frustration 
and/or anger was most often cited. Additional, non-verbal, 
indicators included silence, loss of eye contact, and the 
closing of books and papers. 
Not surprisingly, many of the responses to 
question #29 were similar to those of question #28. Responses 
common to both questions included the perception of 
insufficient concessionary behavior and other manifestations 
of the opponent's intransigence; limited negotiator authority; 
differing perceptions of the seller's risk; the influence of 
internal Government audits and reports; and poor 
communication, particularly listening skills. Nonetheless, 
there were additional reasons provided for the occurrence of 
an impasse, such as the existence of an extremely large 
difference between the negotiators' iniLial positions. This 
indicates that there was probably a negative zone of 
agreement, and that any possible deal was doomed from the 
start. 
Another reason cited for the negotiation ending in 
an impasse was personality clashes. While personality clashes 
were not a pervasive problem as indicated by the responses to 
question #5, they have the potential of being "show-
stoppers." 
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Several DOD negotiators stated that the requiring 
activity's lack of adequate funding, combined with the 
inability or unwillingness to de-scope the statement of work 
to fit the dollars available, resulted in an impasse. This is 
a situation where the price was determined to be fair and 
reasonable, but the buyer simply did not have adequate funding 
to procure the good or service. In essence, it is a •negative 
zone of agreement" scenario. 
A couple of negotiators ascribed the impasse to 
the Government's lack of technical expertise and resultant 
inability to comprehend the seller's position. However, 
reaching an impasse is not the only risk associated with an 
ill-prepared negotiation team. There is also the danger that 
the negotiator will acquiesce to a relatively poor agreement. 
Hence, the importance of a well-prepared and staffed 
negotiation team cannot be over-emphasized. 
Some negotiators' responses indicated that a lack 
of trust of their opponents was responsible for the impasse. 
One negotiator referred to his opponent's attempt to •gold-
plate" a change order, and another stated that the contractor 
was trying to •get well" due to cash flow problems. Given the 
environment of mistrust surrounding these negotiations, 
founded or unfounded, it is not surprising that they ended 
without an agreement. 
Other, singular responses attributed the impasse 
to an unreasonable corporate policy (which was not elaborated 
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on in the questionnaire}, and the opponent's belief that his 
superior negotiator power would force the Government to 
capitulate. These responses will not be examined because in 
the former case the "unreasonable" corporate policy was not 
delineated, and the implications of the latter have been 
previously discussed. 
b. Illdustzy 
The responses to questions #28 and #2 affirm 
several impasse- related signals and factors identifieu earlier 
in this study. These signals and factors include the lack 
of concessionary behavior; use of the threat of deadlock; 
personality clashes; differing perceptions of the selL:r' s 
risk; the influence of Government-internal reports or audits; 
inadequate communication between the parties; "low-ball" 
offers or counter-offers; insufficient negotiator authority; 
low levels of trust between the negotiators; frustration and 
anger manifested through "body language" (staring, folded 
arms, avoiding eye contact} and silence; and delays in the 
negotiation process. However, there were several groupings of 
responses which merit discussion. 
Several negotiators indicated that their 
opponents' willingness to involve supervisory management 
personnel in the negotiations was a signal that an impasse may 
ensue. Their rationale was that a negotiator who undertakes 
such action either lacks sufficient authority to reach an 
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agreement, or lacks the skill, motivation and commitment to 
work with his counterpart towards reaching an agreement. 
Industry negotiators also identified their 
opponents' use of the threat of issuing unilateral change 
orders as a warning sign of an impasse. The use of threats, 
whether they involve litigation, deadlock or change orders, 
are regarded as contentious acts. As discussed earlier, 
contentious acts invite retaliation, and thus heighten the 
risk of an impasse. 
Two negotiators blamed the impasse on the fact 
that contract performance had already been completed or 
substantially completed. In these instances, DOD had issued 
letter contracts to permit the contractor to commence work 
prior to contract definitization negotiations. These 
negotiators felt that their negotiator power was substantially 
weakened by the fact that they could not use the passage of 
time to their aavantage. That is, since the contract had 
already been completed or substantially completed, the 
pressure of "time" had been practically eliminated. 
Consequently, the DOD negotiators were not impelled to "cave 
in" to the contractor's demands. 
Both DOD and industry upper management' s 
limitations on negotiator authority contributed to the impasse 
scenario. By limiting authority, the negotiators involved 
were denied the latitude and decision-making capability 
necessary to effectively bargain. As a result, the 
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negotiations were quickly escalated to upper management for 
resolution. Although limiting negotiator authority is often 
appropriate, it should not be so restrictive that the 
negotiator is unable to effectively perform his duties. 
One negotiator attributed the impasse to a poorly 
written Request for Quotation (RFQ). This is not surprising, 
because a poorly written RFQ is more vulnerable to 
misinterpretation, and hence more likely to initiate a 
disagreement or impasse. 
s. Comparative Analysis 
The responses of DOD and industry negotiators were 
generally similar, and supported previous findings of this 
study. Both groups of negotiators distinguished the following 
impasse- related warning signs and factors: differing 
perceptions of the seller's risk; the use of deadlock as a 
negotiation tactic; the influence of Government internal 
audits and reports on DOD negotiators; reactive devaluation of 
concessions; inadequate negotiator authority; delays in the 
negotiation process; frustration and anger manifested through 
"body language" (staring, folded arms, avoiding eye contact), 
and silence; poor communication between the parties; lack of 
trust of one's opponent; and personality conflicts. 
Obviously, there are many impasse-related warning signs and 
factors which are universally recognized among negotiators. 
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While there were some warning signals and factors 
which were not identified by both groups of negotiators, it 
was probably due more to the nature of the questions than any 
fundamental difference between the two groups. Question #28 
asked for the number one signal or cue, and question #29 asked 
for a very brief explanation of why the negotiation ended in 
impasse. Thus, while many different factors likely 
contributed to any one impasse, only the most significant of 
those were reported by each individual negotiator. It is 
likely that most, if not all, signals and factors were 
experienced by both groups; it's just that their relative 
importance differed to some degree. 
Of more significance was the identification and 
analysis of several impasse-related signals and factors not 
previously discussed in chapters three and four. 
included: 
They 
• Use of the threat of litigation. 
• Inadequate negotiator authority. 
• Delays in the negotiation process. 
• Lack of adequate funding. 
• Lack of trust of one's opponent. 
• Opponent's willingness to involve supervisory 
management in the negotiation process. 
• DOD negotiators employing the threat of 
unilateral change orders. 
• Poorly written solicitations/RFPs/RFQs. 
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• Frustration and anger manifested through 
"body language" (staring, folded arms, 
avoiding eye contact) , and silence. 
• Poorly prepared/staffed negotiation team. 
C. AVOIDDtG TIIB DCPASSB 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to present and analyze 
DOD and defense industry negotiators' responses to three 
questions principally concerning measures which may have 
avoided an impasse, two of which were open-ended. These 
questions required the negotiators to state in specific terms 
any actions and strategies which they or their opponents may 
have employed in order to avoid an impasse. 
2. Questions 
Questions #7, #30 and #31 are included in this 
section. 
OYESTIQN 17. To what extent do you believe that one 
party's ability to objectively evaluate the other party's 
position is important to avoiding an impasse? 
Pur:pose: To ascertain how important negotiators feel 
perspective-taking ability is to avoiding an impasse. 
Empirical evidence indicates that there are some negotiators 
who are more accurate in their interpersonal judgments and 
better able to objectively assess an opposing negotiator's 
position [Ref. 17:p. 501. This perspective-taking ability 
(PTA) positively affects the concessionary tendencies of 
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negotiators and the likelihood that an agreement will be 
reached. This question was scaled 1 to 5, with 1 representing 
"of low importance" and 5 representing •high importance.• 
OQESTIQN # 30. Briefly describe any actions or steps 
you and/or your opponent might have taken which could have 
avoided an impasse. 
py~ose. This was one of the principal purposes of 
this study: to gain an awareness of how a contract 
negotiations impasse may be avoided. The question was open-
ended. 
OQESTIQN #31. If you had strong indications that an 
impasse may result, what changes would you have made to your 
bargaining strategy that would have facilitated an agreement? 
Pu~ose: Closely related to question #30, this 
question asks the negotiator to focus specifically on changes 
to his strategy which may have fostered an agreement. The 
question was open-ended. 
3. Results 
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b. Ouestion 130. 
Answers received from DOD respondents are cited below. 
• "Eliminate upper management meddling to the 
maximum extent possible." 
• "A wider latitude for compromise should have 
been granted by upper management." 
• "Recognized different, and perhaps 
incompatible interests, motives and 
obligations, and made some effort to assist 
the other party." 
• "Assisted my opponent in obtaining a better 
understanding of the requirements and actual 
work involved." 
• "Used more face-to-face negotiations; a 
majority of the negotiation took place over 
the phone." 
• "My opponent could have been more open with 
information instead of trying to conceal 
information." 
• "Ensured negotiation team members were better 
educated/prepared for the negotiations." 
• "Specifications could have been written less 
restrictively.• 
• "I should have not made major concessions 
early in negotiations because it shifted the 
negotiation middle ground in the contractor's 
mind. n 
INDUStRY 
Answers received from industry respondents are cited 
• "Both parties should have concentrated more 
on the issues." 
• "Kept personalities out of the negotiations." 
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• "Really listen to what the other party was 
saying, and not be so skeptical of what was 
said." 
• "Better, faster communication. I would have 
brought all pertinent parties together 
sooner." 
• "Buyer should have alerted seller of funding 
limitations and not just try and get the job 
done for an unrealistic price.• 
• "More intensive 
negotiations.• 
fact-finding 
• "Brainstormed creative solutions.• 
prior to 
• "Substantiated our proposals 
differently/better to allow customer to be 
able to move to a higher number." 
• "Brought in more help (experts)." 
• "I would have readjusted my targets - reset 
min~ acceptable figures based on new 
facts.• 
• "PCO should have retained the flexibility to 
settle.• 
• "Avoided our upper management." 
c. Question #31. 
Answers received from DOD respondents are cited below. 
• "Allowed each party to characterize the 
'agreement' on individual issues in his own 
way but identify larger areas where the 
parties must agree on price." 
• "Brought in more technical assistance." 
• "Decreased the number of supposed 'players• 
at the negotiation table." 




• "Spent more time in fact- finding to more 
clearly understand his position.• 
• "Required appropriate level of contractor 
management to be present for all negotiation 
sessions." 
• •strategies wouldn't have helped in this 
situation; we were too far apart.• 
• "Since I suspected the contractor was 
submitting fraudulent data, I would not 
change my overall strategy in bargaining. 
Strictly 'hardball'." 
INPUSTBY 
Answers received from industry respondents are cited 
• "More listening, less talking." 
• "Should have requested a more realistic 
target from upper management." 
• "Would have had more conmunication between 
offers and before counteroffers. We could 
have slowed natural tendency to 'rush' 
counteroffers." 
• "I probably would have been more upfront. It 
would have been better to avoid a unilateral 
or litigated resolution. I would keep 
lawyers out of discussions as long as 
possible.• 
• "Modified the proposal dollars to fit the 
constraints." 
cut hours and 
buyer' s budget 
• "I would have sat down and discussed fee 
philosophy/PAR more fully.• 
• •None. My best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement was to walk away." 
• "Not have accepted the letter contract." 
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• "I would have at tempted to gain leverage 
through timing by waiting until the schedule 




The overall response to question #7 was hardly 
DOD negotiators overwhelmingly agreed that a 
negotiator's perspective-taking ability is an important factor 
in avoiding an impasse. A negotiator who has a well- developed 
ability to view the negotiation from his opponent's position 
is far more likely not only to reach an agreement, but to 
reach a favorable agreement. 
DOD negotiators' responses to question #30 
provided several actions which could have been taken to help 
avoid an impasse. Several negotiators believed that an 
impasse may have been avoided had upper management not 
interfered, ~~d granted the negotiator sufficient latitude to 
reach an agreement. This is not surprising, as these same 
negotiators identified upper management as the number one 
cause of the negotiations impasse. While upper management 
must set limits on the actual authority of its negotiators, 
they also must allow the negotiator sufficient latitude to 
reach an agreement; otherwise, they may as well conduct the 
negotiations themselves. 
As indicated by the responses to question #7, 
negotiators recognized the value of perspective-taking 
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ability in avoiding an impasse. Negotiators who are able to 
"place themselves in their opponent's shoes" possess a better 
understanding of their opponent's motives and needs, and can 
more effectively strive towards an integrative agreement. 
Numerous negotiators stated that actions taken to 
improve the communication between the parties could have 
avoided an impasse. Negotiators must effectively communicate 
relevant information to their opponents in order to facilitate 
integrative agreements, which involves creatively searching 
for ways to expand the size of the total "pie" available for 
apportionment to both parties. 
without clear and adequate 
As discussed in chapter three, 
communication of pertinent 
information between the parties, the odds of an impasse become 
significantly greater. 
Some negotiators believed that a better prepared 
negotiation team would have facilitated an agree."ent. A 
poorly prepared negotiation team is incapable of adequately 
understanding not only the opponent's position, but likely 
their own as well. Further, perspective-taking ability is 
necessarily low, and the flow of communication between the 
parties is much less effective when one or both parties are 
unprepared and overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
negotiation. Adequate preparation is unquestionably one of 
the most important elements, if not the most important, of 
negotiating. Insufficient preparation is harmful not only 
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because the negotiator "may not know a good deal when he sees 
one," but because he may agree to a poor deal. 
A couple of negotiators stated that easing the 
specification requirements would have facilitated an 
agreement. In retrospect, they realized that overly 
restrictive specifications increased the risk to the 
contractor, who naturally demanded a proportionately higher 
price to accept the risk. As discussed earlier, differing 
perceptions of the seller's risk is a major impasse-related 
factor. Therefore, it is important for those who write 
specifications, or statements of work, to specify the minimum 
criteria necessary to meet the Government' s requirements. 
Perhaps, an even better solution would be to utilize 
performance specifications whenever possible, because they are 
less restrictive in nature. 
One negotiator asserted that his early, major 
concessions led to the impasse because it raised the 
aspiration level of his opponent. As indicated in chapter 
two, concession-making is a double-edged sword. While 
necessary in reaching agreements, it may also elevate the 
negotiation objective of one's opponent. Another related 
factor, one must assume, is that this negotiator's opponent 
did not make adequate concessions in return, which is a major 
impasse-related factor in and of itself. 
Several responses to question #31 echoed those of 
question #30, including the importance of adequate 
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negotiation preparation and of loosening over-restrictive 
specifications. However, there were many responses which 
differed, which will now be discussed. 
One negotiator stated that he would have altered 
his strategy to allow both parties to characterize the 
agreement in their own terms, so long as required •bottom 
line" considerations, such as total price, were equivalent. 
For example, say two negotiators agree on a firm-fixed price 
contract for $1,380,000. The seller would be free to break 
down the $1,380,000 price into cost and profit as necessary to 
gain the approval of upper management. If the seller's upper 
management wanted 20%' profit, then he can report cost and 
profit figures of $1,150,000 and $230,000 respectively. If 
the buyer's upper management's objective was 1St profit, then 
he has the flexibility to report the costs as $1,200,000 and 
the profit as $180, 000. This flexibility enhances the ability 
to reach an agreement, because both parties can claim that 
they met their objectives. 
A few negotiators discussed bargaining strategy 
with respect to their negotiation teams. As discussed 
earlier, some stated that they should have brought in more 
technical assistance. Others stated in effect that they 
should have acted to eliminate some of the non-players who 
were present at the negotiations. This is an important point, 
because a bigger team does not necessarily mean a better 
team. In fact, the larger the negotiation team, the tougher 
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it is for the negotiation team leader to coordinate and 
control the actions of its members. It is just as important 
not to have too many team members, as it is not to have too 
few. The trick is in determining the personnel "mix" which 
will maximize the negotiation team's effectiveness, and then 
staff accordingly. 
Other negotiators stated that they should have 
required the contractor's upper management to be present at 
the negotiations because their opponents did not have 
sufficient latitude to negotiate agreements. However, upper 
management involvement in the negotiation process has been 
identified by negotiators as an impasse-related factor. So, 
while one negotiator may believe that involving the opponent's 
upper management in the negotiations may help avoid an 
impasse, the opposing negotiator may believe that involving 
upper management in the negotiations increases the odds of an 
impasse. In fact, they both may be correct, depending on how 
one defines an impasse. Involving an opponent 1 s upper 
management in the negotiations may increase the probability 
of reaching an agreement 1 because upper management has greater 
negotiator authority. On the other hand, a negotiation which 
is unable to achieve an agreement without being elevated to 
the upper management level constitutes an impasse as 
previously defined, because the "original" negotiators 
themselves were unable to achieve an agreement. 
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Some negotiators indicated that changing their 
strategy would not have facilitated an agreement, while others 
stated that they would not have changed their strategy. In 
the first instance, the most conunon reason was that the 
parties' positions were extremely far apart. This suggests 
that there was not a positive zone of agreement, meaning the 
negotiators' best alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
(BATNA) were to walk away from the table. If this is in fact 
the case, then it is better to walk away from the table than 
to reach an agreement which is worse than no agreement at all. 
Reaching an agreement is irrational if it leaves a party 
worse off than they were without an agreement. The message 
is, an impasse is only "bad" when two parties who would have 
each benefitted from an agreement are unable to reach an 
agreement. 
Negotiators who stated that they would not have 
changed their strategy invariably justified their positions by 
blaming their opponents' irrational, deceitful or otherwise 
contentious behavior. As discussed earlier, each of these are 
major impasse-related factors. Evidently, these negotiations 
were doomed from the beginning. 
b. Industry 
The general response to question #7 was fully 
expected: Industry negotiators widely agreed that a 
negotiator• s perspective-taking ability is a crucial factor in 
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achieving an agreement. A negotiator who has a finely-honed 
ability to view the negotiation from his opponent's position 
is more apt not only to reach an agreement, but to reach an 
advantageous agreement. 
In response to question #30, several negotiators 
believed that if both sides would have focused on the relevant 
issues and avoided allowing counterproductive activities such 
as personality conflicts to influence the negotiations, that 
an impasse may have been avoided. Contract negotiations are 
cften a difficult and complex process, therefore both parties 
must attempt to avoid counterproductive activities which only 
complicate matters further. 
Some negotiators stated that both they and their 
opponents should have taken steps to improve their degree and 
quality of listening and communication. As discussed 
previously, communication is an integral element of 
negotiations, and listening is an integral element of 
communication. Improved communication will doubtlessly 
increase the likelihood of achieving an agreement. 
Several negotiators believed that more intensive 
fact-finding would have facilitated an agreement. They 
concluded that because the buyer did not spend sufficient 
time fact-finding, they were unable to fully understand and 
appreciate the seller's position. Preparation is arguably the 
most important element of negotiating. As mentioned 
previously, insufficient preparation is harmful not only 
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because a negotiator •may not ~~ow a good deal when he sees 
one,• but because he may agree to a poor deal. 
A few negotiators concluded that "brainstorming" 
creative solutions would have facilitated an agreement. This 
is understandable, because searching for creative solutions is 
a central ingredient to achieving integrative agreements, and 
for.ms the basis for the Win-Win approach to negotiating. 
A number of negotiators suggested that they could 
have avoided an impasse by providing better justification of 
their proposals, thus enabling the seller to rationalize 
moving to a higher price. The seller's proposal is a key 
source of information to the buyer. The more complete and 
well-justified a proposal is, the more likely it is that the 
buyer will be convinced to move to a higher price, and 
therefore the more likely it is that a favorable agreement 
will be reached. 
One negotiator stated that he should have 
readjusted his negotiation objective based on information 
provided by his opponent. This is a key point, because for 
the exchange of information between negotiators to be 
meaningful, the parties must be willing and capable of 
objectively evaluating the information provided. This also 
suggests that negotiators must at least moderately trust each 
other, for objectivity is impossible without it. 
Other industry negotiator responses mentioned 
actions which have already been discussed, including 
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negotiator authority, upper management interference, and the 
expertise of the negotiation team. 
Many responses to question #31 regarding 
bargaining strategy have been discussed previously, and will 
not be examined further. However, there were four groups of 
responses which merit discussion. 
One group of responses dealt with the problem of 
inadequate negotiator authority. The solution was simple: 
ask upper management for more authority, or request permission 
to move to a more realistic negotiation objective. The 
significance of this response is that negotiators should bring 
these matters to the attention of upper management, and upper 
management should not rebuke those who do. A negotiator's 
effectiveness is determined in large part by the support, or 
lack thereof, of upper management. 
Another group of responses discussed the process 
of making offers and counteroffers. These respondents stated 
that they should have resisted the natural tendency to "rush" 
counteroffers. This is noteworthy, because it suggests that 
"rushing" a counteroffer may not allow sufficient time to 
thoroughly consider the opponent's counteroffer, and instead 
may allow emotion to influence the response. So, while 
earlier findings of this study indicate that significant 
delays can jeopardize the negotiation process, so can hastily 
prepared counteroffers. 
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A third group of respondents indicated that they 
could have modified the proposal to accommodate the budgetary 
constraints of the buyer. This may or may not be a viable 
option, depending on the nature of the work. In negotiations 
where it is a viable alternative, the seller should raise the 
issue with the buyer; it may provide a means of salvaging an 
otherwise "doomed" negotiation. 
The fourth group of responses related to the use 
of leverage, or negotiator power. These respondents concluded 
that they did not fully exploit their negotiation power, and 
essentially let the Government "off the hook." They believed 
that if they had properly exercised their superior power, they 
would have forced the Government to reach an agreement. 
However, as McAlister's experiments demonstrated (weakly 
corroborated in the instant research), negotiations involving 
negotiators possessing unequal power are more likely to end in 
an impasse, than those involving negotiators possessing equal 
power [Ref. 16:pp. 278-279]. Thus, the effectiveness of this 
particular strategy is unclear; it depends on the individual 
circumstances. 
5. Comparative Analysis 
This subsection will compare the responses of DOD and 
industry negotiators to question #7, but will not compare the 
responses to questions #30 and #31. Although there are 
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similarities and differences between the two groups' responses 
to questions #30 and #31, an analysis of why they are similar 
or different is of no consequence. Instead, the responses 
will be broken down into three groups: DOD-applicable, 
industry-applicable, and generally applicable. 
A comparison of DOD and industry negotiator responses 
to question #7 indicates that both groups overwhelmingly 
agreed that a negotiator's perspective-taking ability is an 
important factor in avoiding an impasse. A negotiator who has 
a well-developed ability to look at the negotiation from his 
opponent's position is far more likely not only to reach an 
agreement, but to reach a favorable agreement. 
The responses to questions #30 and #31 provided 
valuable insight into how a contract negotiations impasse may 
be avoided. As mentioned above, the suggestions are broken 
down into three groupings: (1) DOD-applicable; (2) industry-
applicable; and, (3) generally applicable. 
DOD-Agplicable 
• Loosen overly-restrictive specifications. 
• Conduct more intensive fact-finding prior to 
negotiations. 
IndustkY-1\gplicable 
• De-scope statement of work to accommodate 
buyer's budgetary limitations. 
Generally APplicable 
• Improve communication between the parties. 
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D. SUMMARY 
• Improve the performance of the negotiation 
team. 
• Allow negotiators to characterize the 
agreement in their own terms whenever 
possible. 
• Focus on the relevant issues. 
• Avoid personality conflicts. 
• "Brainstorm• for potential solutions. 
• Objectively consider information provided by 
opponent. 
• Request appropriate negotiation authority 
from upper management as required. 
• Avoid needlessly •rushing" counteroffers. 
This chapter examined DOD and industry negotiator 
responses to qu~stions regarding the warning signals or cues 
of a contra~t negotiations impasse, and how an impasse may be 
avoided. The following is a summary of the significant 
findings of this chapter: 
CAUSES OF AN IMPASSE: 
• Use of the threat of litigation. 
• Inadequate negotiator authority. 
• Delays in the negotiation process. 
• Lack of adequate funding. 
• Lack of trust of one's opponent. 
• Opponent's willingness to involve supervisory 
management in the negotiation process. 
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• DOD negotiators employing the threat of 
unilateral change orders. 
• Poorly written solicitations/RFPs/RFQs. 
AVOIDING AN rHPASSB: 
• Loosen specifications which are overly-
restrictive. (DOD) 
• Conduct more intensive fact-finding prior to 
negotiations. (DOD) 
• De- scope statement of work to accommodate 
buyer's budgetary limitations. (Industry) 
• Improve communication between the parties. 
• Improve the level of preparedness of the 
negotiation team. 
• Allow each negotiator to characterize the 
agreement in their own terms whenever 
possible. 
• Focus on the relevant issues. 
• Avoid personality conflicts. 
• •arainsto~· potential solutions. 
• Objectively consider information provided by 
opponent. 
• Request additional negotiation authority from 
upper management when required. 
• Avoid needlessly expediting counteroffers. 
Chapter VI will present the conclusions and 
reconunenclations stenming from this research, answer the 
primary and subsidiary research questions, and suggest areas 
of further research. 
125 
VI. CONCLUSIONS ARD RBCOIIKBHDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions 
and recommendations derived from the research, answer the 
primary and subsidiary research questions, and suggest areas 
of further research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions are a sequence of analytically drawn 
opinions based on the research conducted into the contract 
negotiations impasse scenario. The conclusion will be cited 
first, followed by a justification of that conclusion. 
1. DQD and in4ust&Y negotiators similarly define a contract 
negotiation impasse. 
While industry negotiators' definitions tended to be more 
homogeneous than DOD negotiators' definitions, both groups 
generally defined an impasse as a circumstance where two 
specific negotiators ultimately fail to reach an agreement. 
Another commonly mentioned characteristic was the escalation 
of the negotiation process to higher levels within the 
respective organizations. In essence, the defining 
characteristics of a contract negotiation impasse are finality 
and the "ordered pair" relationship of the negotiators. 
1.26 
2. Fixed-Price contract negotiations are more prone to 
end in an impasse than cost-reimbursable contract 
negotiations. 
Ninety- one percent of the contracts involved in a contract 
negotiation impasse were fixed-price. The percentage of 
negotiated contracts which were fixed-price within DOD in 1992 
was approximately seventy-five percent [Ref. 1:p. 83]. The 
difference is significant; therefore, negotiations which 
contemplate the use of fixed-price contracts are more likely 
to end in an impasse than if a cost-type contract is being 
discussed. This is because a fixed-price contract is far 
riskier to the seller than a cost-reimbursement contract, and 
because the buyer and seller generally hold differing 
perceptions of the level of the seller's risk. 
3. A sole/single sgurce contract negotiation is 
significantly more likely to end in an impasse than 
negotiations in a competitive enyironrnent. 
Nearly 90% of the negotiations included in this study 
involved a seller who was a sole or single source. This 
percentage is significantly higher than the 38% of negotiated 
contracts which were sole or single source within DOD in 1992 
[Ref. 1:p. 83}. A reasonable explanation is that the sole or 
single-sourcJ power of the seller is offset in many cases by 
the monopsony power of the Government: the U.S. Government is 
the sole customer for most military-unique products and weapon 
systems. This may explain why that the balance of negotiator 
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power was perceived to be nearly equal despite the fact that 
in nearly all negotiations the DOD negotiator faced a 
sole/single source seller. 
4. Negotiators generally have a biased view of the 
negotiation grocess. 
Contract negotiations are fraught with the shortcomings of 
human nature, most prevalent of which is the tendency for 
negotiatiors to frame the negotiation in terms which support 
their positions. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
contract negotiators generally perceive their actions to be 
rational and reasonable, and their opponents' actions as just 
the opposite. This biased viewpoint is evident from the 
responses to the questions pertaining to concessionary 
behavior, the use of the threat of deadlock, negotiation 
strategy (Win-Win, Win-Lose), as well as the open-ended 
responses concerning the causes of the impasse. Generally, 
negotiators believed it was the "other guy's fault" that the 
negotiation ended in an impasse. 
5. DOD and industry contract negotiators hold similar 
views of the impasse scenario. 
Excluding those questions to which the negotiators' 
responses were predictably prejudiced, the responses of DOD 
and industry negotiators were remarkably alike. In fact, 
there was only case (question #8 concerning deception) where 
there was a statistical difference between the mean responses 
of the two groups which could not be explained by negotiator 
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bias, and it was only marginally significant. In all other 
instances, the differences in their responses were either 
statistically insignificant, or if significant, could be 
readily attributed to negotiator bias. 
6. Government-internal audits and reports significantly 
influence DOD contract negotiators' concessionary behavior. 
A significant minority of DOD negotiators, 30%, and the 
vast majority, nearly 90%, of industry negotiators indicated 
that internal Government reports or audits influenced the DOD 
negotiator's position, such that he was unwilling to move from 
that position. To the extent that a report or audit 
represents a "fair and reasonable" position, their influence 
on the negotiator's position is not detrimental to the 
negotiation process; however, to the extent that an 
inaccurate report or audit inhibits a negotiator from making 
reasonable concessions, they are detrimental to the 
negotiation process, and increase the likelihood of an 
impasse. 
7. U:m>er management's actions and/or policies often 
contribute to an impasse. 
A significant number of DOD and industry negotiators 
identified upper management pressure, overly-restrictive 
policies regarding negotiator authority, and general 
"meddling" in the negotiation process as major impasse-related 
factors. 
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8. Negotiator overconfidence and aspiration leyels were 
not roajor impasse-related factors. 
Surprisingly, DOD and industry negotiators' assessments of 
the balance of negotiator power were nearly perfectly 
complementary, suggesting that, in general, neither group was 
overconfident of the strength of their bargaining positions. 
This conclusion supports the negotiators' general contention 
that their aspiration levels were not at such a high level 
that they led to an impasse. 
C. RBCOJOIBNDATIONS 
The following recommendations are pertinent not only to 
the instant research, but to the negotiation process as a 
whole. Included are several recommended changes to the 
questionnaire. 
1. Negotiator education and training should emphasize an 
integrative approach towards contract negotiations. 
It was evident that most negotiations included in this 
study were adversarial in nature. This adversarial 
relationship may be improved by providing contract negotiators 
with training designed to engender a more rational, 
integrative approach to negotiations. Integrative bargaining 
dictates that the negotiators creatively search for ways to 
increase the size of the total "pie" available for 
distribution to both parties. Fashioning integrative 
agreements requires negotiator objectivity, a free- flow of 
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information between the parties, and abstention from the use 
of contentious tactics or actions: three of the most 
significant impasse-related factors derived from this 
research. 
2. Negotiators should thoroughly prepare for 
negotiations. 
Several negotiators attributed the impasse to poorly 
prepared negotiators and negotiator teams. This was evidenced 
by inadequate fact-finding, inexperienced and poorly trained 
team members, and an obvious lack of understanding of the 
particular issues at hand. 
In negotiations, knowledge is power. Adequate preparation 
is unquestionably one of the most important elements, if not 
the most important, of the negotiation process. As the team 
leader, it is the lead negotiator's responsibility to ensure 
that his team is well-prepared for the task at hand. 
3 . u~er management should focus rnore on the needs of 
contract negotiators. 
Many contract negotiators indicated that upper 
managements' actions and policies were largely responsible for 
their negotiations ending in an impasse. The most often cited 
instances included not granting negotiators adequate authority 
to effectively conduct negotiations, and pressuring 
negotiators not just to avoid an impasse, but to reach a 
favorable agreement. 
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Upper management needs to ensure that their contract 
negotiators have the requisite tools to be successful, namely 
adequate authority to negotiate, training, and skilled staff 
personnel(e.g., technical and cost experts}. Contract 
negotiators cannot be successful without the backing of upper 
management. 
4. DOD and industry negotiators should take steps to 
increase the level of mutual cooperation and trust. 
Many of the negotiations involved in this research were 
adversarial in nature. Increased interaction between DOD and 
industry negotiators would expand the level of mutual 
cooperation and trust. To this end, DOD and industry 
negotiators should seek out forums where they have the 
opportunity to increase the level of understanding of each 
other's environment,such as the National Contract Management 
Association (NCMA) , Government/Industry study groups, and 
joint membership on boards and committees. Greater 
understanding between DOD and industry negotiators can only 
improve the contract negotiation process. 
5. The following gyestionnaire changes should be made: 
a. Revise question #6. 
Question #6 was unclear as to its intent. Revise the 
question to read: "Do you believe that most of the impasse 
negotiations you have experienced involved a large number of 
contentious issues as opposed to a small amount?" Scale the 
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question 1 to 5, with 1 representing •small• and 5 
representing "large.• 
b. A4d the following gyestions to complement 
gyestions #21 and #22. 
Add the following question to complement question #21 
regarding organizational pressure to reach an agreement: • In 
your experience, is the level of organizational pressure to 
reach an agreement generally greater or less in negotiations 
ending in an impasse versus negotiations in which an agreement 
was reached?" Scale the question 1 to 5, with 1 representing 
"significantly less" and 5 representing •significantly 
greater." 
Add the following question to complement question #22 
regarding the balance of negotiator power: "In general, do 
you perceive the balance of negotiator power to be 
significantly greater or less in your favor in negotiations 
ending in an impasse versus negotiations which end in 
agreement?• Scale the question 1 to 5, with 1 representing 
"sign.ificantly less• and 5 representing •significantly 
greater." 
c. Add the following gyestions: 
1. "Was an agreement ultimately reached at some level 
in the organization? If so, please briefly indicate the 
respective levels in the buyer and seller's organizations at 
which the agreement was reached, and the length of time that 
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expired between the original impasse and the subsequent 
agreement." 
2. "What percentage of the contract negotiations you 
have been involved with ended in an impasse?" 
3. "Of the contract negotiation impasses you have 
been involved in, what was the largest dollar amount being 
discussed? What was the smallest amount?" 
D. AHSWBRS TO TBB RBSBARCB QUBSTIOHS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Wbat are the principal factors and characteristics 
that lead to a contract negotiation impasse and how might the 
knowledge of these characteristics and factors be utilized to 
improve the negotiation process and avoid an impasse? 
The principal impasse-related factors include: (1) a 
negative zone of agreement; (2) employment of contentious 
tactics and other actions; (3) poor communication between the 
parties; (4) poorly prepared negotiation teams; (5) upper 
management interference and/or lack of support; and (6) 
negotiators' biased views of the negotiation. One or more of 
these factors were present in every negotiation impasse 
involved in this study. 
An awareness of these factors would enable negotiators 
to better avoid these "negotiation hazards, n thereby improving 
the negotiation process and reducing the percentage of 
negotiations ending in an impasse. 
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2. SubaicSiary lleaearch Queationa 
Wbat are the key cbaracteristics of a contract 
negotiation impasse? 
Both contract negotiators and the literature similarly 
defined the contract negotiation impasse as an ultimate 
failure of two particular negotiators to reach an agreement. 
This differs from a stalemate, which is a t~rary stalling 
point in the negotiations. Negotiations which end in an 
impasse may, or may not, encounter stalemates along the way. 
The objective of a negotiation which ended in an impasse may 
ultimately be achieved by means of a subsequent negotiation, 
usually via escalation to higher levels within the respective 
organizations. However, the defining characteristics of a 
contract negotiation impasse are finality and the nordered 
pair" relationship of the negotiators. 
Wbat are the typical situations and scenarios wbich 
lead to a contract negotiation impasse? 
The following situations and scenarios typically lead 
to a contract negotiation impasse: 
• A negative zone of agreement. 
• Fixed price/sole source contract 
negotiations. 
• Differing perceptions of the seller's risk. 
• The perception of contentious tactics and 
other actions (verbal and non-verbal) . 
• Poorly prepared/trained/staffed negotiators 
and/or negotiation teams. 
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• Upper management pressure/interference. 
• Inadequate negotiator authority. 
• Unnecessary and lengthy delays in the 
negotiation process. 
• Poor communication between the parties. 
• The presence of Government internal audits or 
reports which significantly differ with the 
offeror's proposal. 
• Reactive devaluation of concessions. 
Wbat are the actions or steps which could be taken by 
contract negotiators to avoid an impasse? 
Contract negotiators could take the following actions: 
• Carefully consider the seller's risk when 
selecting the contract type. 
• Seek competition; 






• Improve communication: listen objectively, 
ask questions, facilitate understanding, 
avoid lengthy/unnecessary delays. 
• Strive to improve "perspective-taking 
ability.• Seek to minimize natural biases. 
• •Brainstorm" possible solutions; integrative approach to negotiations. 
take 
• Avoid use of contentious tactics/actions. 
• Ensure thorough preparation of self and team 
for negotiations. 
• If negotiation authority is inadequate, 
request additional authority. 
• Question internal Government audits or 
reports suspected of being erroneous. (DOD 
negotiators) 
• Be open-minded and flexible: don't be afraid 
to make a good business decision. 
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B. SlJGGBSTIOBS PO:R. PU:aTBB:a USDRCII 
Negotiations involving poorly prepared contract 
negotiators increase the likelihood of an impasse. Education 
and training are significant determinants of negotiator 
preparedness. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 
Act (DAWIA} underscores the importance with which DOD and 
Congress view the education and training of DOD acquisition 
professionals, including contract negotiators. Research into 
the perceived adequacy of negotiator education and training in 
both Government and industry, including recommendations for 
improvement would be both interesting and useful. 
The rapid downsizing of the defense budget is leading many 
defense contractors to focus more attention to overseas arms 
markets, such as the Middle East. Many, if not most, of these 
markets' cultures and customs are very different from our own. 
Research into the difficulties inherent in international 
contract negotiations, and recommendations of how to improve 
the negotiation process would also be very fascinating and 
beneficial. 
Contract negotiations ending in an impasse often end up in 
lengthy and costly litigation. Research into the 
applicability, usage and effectiveness of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR} processes in Government and industry would 
also be an area of great interest. 
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